Bolivia pursues hydro-power deal with China

Bolivia pursues hydro-power deal with China
July 30, 2012
China National News (IANS)

http://www.chinanationalnews.com/index.php?sid/207838416/scat/9366300fc9319e9b

Bolivia signed a memorandum of understanding with Hydrochina Corporation
that calls for the Chinese state-owned firm to conduct a free
feasibility study for the construction of a hydroelectric power plant in
the eastern province of Santa Cruz, the Andean nation's richest region,
said authorities.

The memorandum was signed Friday night by Hydrocarbons and Energy
Minister Juan Jose Sosa and Hydrochina Corporation representatives in
the presence of Chinese Ambassador to Bolivia Li Dong, the hydrocarbons
and energy Ministry said in a statement.

The document calls for Hydrochina to provide the feasibility study to
the Bolivian government on the Rositas hydroelectric power project in
Santa Cruz within 90 days "at no charge".

If Bolivia accepts the study, Hydrochina would design and build the
power plant, which the Bolivian government says would have an installed
generating capacity of 400 MW.

Failure to submit the feasibility study within the timeframe established
in the memorandum would void the agreement, the ministry said.

President Evo Morales's administration says the Rositas hydroelectric
power plant would allow Bolivia to meet its power needs, especially in
rural areas, and export electricity to neighbouring countries.

--IANS/EFE
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China begins ultra-high voltage transmission line, connects third largest hydro station

China breaks ground on ultra-high voltage transmission line in south
Xinhua News
July 28, 2012

http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/723876.shtml

Construction on a west-to-east ultra-high voltage direct current (UHV
DC) power transmission project kicks off in southeast China's Zhejiang
province on Saturday, marking the nation's latest efforts to ease power
shortages in its eastern regions.

The project, funded by the State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC), will
transport about 40 billion kilowatt-hours of hydropower from Xiluodu
Hydropower Station in southwest China to Zhejiang annually after its
scheduled completion in 2014, saving 12.28 million tonnes of standard
coal or 34 million tonnes in carbon emissions.

The SGCC, the nation's major power grid operator, will invest 23.86
billion yuan (3.79 billion U.S. dollars) in the construction of the project.

Starting in Yibin, a southern city in Sichuan province, the
1679.9-kilometer transmission line will traverse Guizhou, Jiangxi and
Hunan provinces to reach Zhejiang's central city of Jinhua.

The project is the SGCC's third UHV DC power transmission project after
the Xiangjiaba-Shanghai and Jinping-Nanjing transmission lines, which
were completed in 2010 and 2012, respectively, according to Liu Zehong,
director of SGCC's DC power construction department.

The three transmission lines together will support a transmission
capacity of 21.6 million kilowatts and help meet rising power demands in
energy-consuming cities in eastern China, Liu said.

These projects will also help fuel the exploration of clean energy in
the country's water-rich southwestern regions and make water resources
there an economic advantage, which will in turn promote balanced
regional growth, Liu said.

Xiluodu Hydropower Station on the Jinshajiang River is the country's
third largest hydropower project after the Three Gorges project and
Xiangjiaba Hydropower Station.

The installed capacity for hydropower on the Jinshajiang River could
amount to 90 million kilowatts, about five times that of the Three
Gorges project, according to Liu.

UHV, defined as voltage of 1,000 kilovolts or above in alternating
current and 800 kilovolts or above in direct current, is designed to
deliver large quantities of power over long distances with less power
loss than the most commonly used 500-kilovolt lines.
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China-Africa Forum To Address Sustainability, Beijing firms agree to code of conduct

[Some news highlights from FOCAC relating to corporate social
responsibility]

Beijing firms agree to code of conduct

22 July 2012
Weekend Argus

China responds to African complaints

Beijing-Chinese entrepreneurs doing business with Africa have committed
to a Declaration of Social Responsibility to guide their conduct on the
continent.

The code of conduct was agreed to at a meeting here of entrepreneurs
from China and more than 50 African countries on the sidelines of the
Forum for China Africa Co-operation (FOCAC), the main framework for
China-Africa relations.

The declaration seemed designed to address reports of various complaints
about Chinese companies in Africa, ranging from abuse of workers,
through dumping poor quality goods on the continent, to focusing too
much on extracting raw materials and not adding value to them before export.

Yu Ping, the vice-chairperson of the China Council for the Promotion of
International Trade told journalists that the Declaration of Social
Responsibility was one of the main outcomes of the entrepreneurs conference.

He said the declaration called upon Chinese entrepreneurs to consolidate
a new type of relations with Africa, based on the principles of equality
and the long-term development of Africa.

They had agreed to respect African customs, improve the quality of their
products sold in Africa, add value to their products, make greater use
of local inputs, upgrade local industry, transfer technology to locals
and provide social services such as medical care.

In general, the declaration committed the Chinese companies to follow
the guidelines of FOCAC, which completed a two-day meeting at
ministerial level on Friday, and the declaration would be implemented
under the guidance of the Chinese government, Yu said.

At the opening of the ministerial on Thursday, Chinese President Hu
Jintao had committed China to greater support for Africa's economic
objectives, including adding value to products and boosting cross-border
infrastucture to promote regional integration.

Yu was asked why the Chinese companies had decided to establish a
Declaration of Social Responsibility, would it be compulsory and would
there be any sanctions for companies which flouted it.

He said in general corporate responsibility "was a matter of ethics
rather than law so the best way to strengthen social responsibility is
through education and guidance".

Yu alluded to reports that some African workers and customers had
complained of abuse by Chinese business managers, and of poor Chinese
products. He said much of the Western reporting about abuses by Chinese
companies in Africa was misleading and that Chinese companies were
generally doing well in Africa.

The government was encouraging them to be more active in explaining the
good work they did.

China-Africa Forum To Address Sustainability, Trade Balance
By Wayne Ma

18 July 2012
Dow Jones International News


BEIJING--The fifth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation starting Thursday
will likely address the environmental sustainability of China's
extraction of commodities in Africa, but some experts are skeptical
Beijing can follow through with commitments.

Africa has provided huge opportunities for Chinese companies, especially
those involved in energy. Sinohydro Corp., which built most of China's
Three Gorges Dam, has capitalized on the continent's vast hydropower
resources by developing projects in 21 African countries. Big companies
such as China Petrochemical Corp. and China National Petroleum Corp.
have major oil and gas investments in Angola, Sudan and Libya, all of
which are important exporters of crude oil to China.

"China's central government is very limited in what it can do to control
the huge proportion of Chinese activity in Africa," said Ian Taylor, a
professor at the University of St. Andrews. "A lot of Chinese
corporations don't take into account environmental sustainability in
China itself--why should they be any different in Africa?" Mr. Taylor asked.

Trade is also an growing issue. China's main imports from Africa include
crude oil, copper, coal and iron-ore products, while Africa is a large
buyer of products such as machinery and textiles.

"This trend in Sino-African trade benefits China, which enters African
markets to sell its manufactured goods and buys primary products with
little added value for Africa," according to Daouda Cisse, a researcher
at the Center for Chinese Studies at Stellenbosch University, in a note.
"With the rising purchasing power among Chinese and a shift towards
consumer-driven growth in China, opportunities are presented to move
towards a more balanced trade between China and Africa," he said.

African leaders appear optimistic about the upcoming meeting, according
to the state-run Xinhua news agency.

Niger's President Mahamadou Issoufou said his country expects China to
help boost agricultural production, while Sindiso Ngwenya,
secretary-general of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa,
or Comesa, said he has "great expectations" for the forum, which will
address Africa's infrastructure and energy sectors, Xinhua reported.

FOCAC, as the forum is known, has been held every three years since
2000, has resulted in the removal of numerous trade barriers and Chinese
pledges to provide billions in loans, debt cancellation and
infrastructure projects for African countries.

Since the first meeting, China's trade with Africa has risen 16-fold to
$166.3 billion, according to China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

With China's economy slowing and a government effort to steer away from
energy-intensive industries, Beijing may need to adjust its strategy
this time around.

"2006 was the high point so far, when the Chinese really did go
overboard on their pledges and promises," Mr. Taylor said. "Since then,
the Chinese have been making statements trying to rein in expectations
of African heads of state ... they don't want to be seen as the next
Santa Claus."
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Two articles on public participation in China

[Two articles on public participation and environmental protests in
China, one that was recently featured in the Earth Island Journal:
http://www.earthisland.org/journal/index.php/eij/article/green_dragon.
The other, below, focuses on the role and response of local governments.]

Shifang: a crisis of local rule
By Tang Hao
chinadialogue
July 18, 2012

http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/5049-Shifang-a-crisis-of-local-rule

China's feeble public participation system is forcing people onto the
streets to protect their environmental interests, as the latest
demonstrations in the south-west show. Tang Hao reports.

"In many cities, it's the local government that wants economic
development - not the locals themselves. The benefits to the community
of more polluting factories are limited and unclear, while the
environmental harms are very real."

China has been engrossed in the mass protests in Shifang, Sichuan
province, where on the morning of July 2, locals and police clashed
during demonstrations against a planned molybdenum and copper refinery.
The next day, the government announced a halt to the project, restoring
calm.

Events at Shifang provide the latest signal of an important trend: a
widening of China's environmental movement. No longer is green
campaigning solely the work of a small elite. Ordinary people, whose
interests are at stake, are also taking to the streets.

Just a few years ago, the Chinese environmental lobby comprised a
coterie of enthusiastic, nature-loving pioneers. Even the landmark
protests in 2004 against a string of dams on the Nu River, which would
have had a huge ecological and social impact and were eventually
shelved, were carried out by environmental NGOs, academics and media
figures, some students and a very small number of locals.

More recently, however, concerns over chemical plants in the coastal
cities of Xiamen and Dalian and - this month - in Shifang, have sparked
mass protests involving 10,000 or more people. This is a marked change.
Such protests involve ordinary, local people, have arisen and been
resolved in very similar ways and are becoming more frequent and intense.

Although, in each case, these protests have been quickly resolved, the
root problems remain. The projects that triggered them have the legally
required environmental clearances, so why the political and social
turmoil? Why do local governments exclude local people from the
decision-making process? And why do residents resort to street protests
and borderline violent methods to make their point? Why do these cases
keep happening? Will these protests bring about positive reforms, or the
opposite? To put it simply: what do environmental street protests mean
for China?

The Shifang case reflects a crisis of local governance common in China
today. In many cities, it's the local government that wants economic
development - not the locals themselves. The benefits to the community
of more polluting factories are limited and unclear, while the
environmental harms are very real. The so-called environmental impact
assessment process is, increasingly, a mere formality, with expert
assessments replacing negotiations between groups with differing
interests. With interested parties excluded, local governments use the
assessments to provide scientific backing for projects.

But science cannot replace democracy. Without the participation of
interested parties, no conclusion - no matter how scientific or
authoritative - will be convincing. Ordinary people have extremely
limited opportunities to work within the system, and so the use of
unconventional methods such as street protests is inevitable. The
system's inability to balance interests and allow participation
generates direct confrontation.

Environmental street protests have a wider significance: they are
becoming part of China's overall social movement. In some parts of the
country, there is a comprehensive crisis of local governance, expressed
in the varying degrees of failure to provide justice in environmental
and law-enforcement spheres. Chinese citizens have attempted to do
something about this, but there are very limited channels for them to
participate in politics and make their voices heard, bar social campaigning.

Environmental activism has already developed into one part of China's
expanding social movement. If the Shifang protestors had been pursuing
social justice as well as environmental justice, the number of
participants would have been even higher. Many of the protestors were
only indirectly affected by the project, or imagined they would be
affected, and there was a strong turnout by young protestors.

These street protests make direct and fixed demands. In the past,
Chinese environmentalists have been criticised for choosing soft targets
and moderate strategies, for being more "rational" than "tough". The
result has been that when large state-owned enterprises have been
involved in environmental incidents - such as the pollution of the
Songhua River in November 2005 caused by explosions at a petrochemical
plant in Jilin, or the blast and oil spill in Dalian, north-east China,
in the summer of 2010 - they have avoided speaking out or taking action.

But local street protests use more radical methods. In Shifang, some
demonstrators broke through police lines and attacked government
buildings. These are actions born of the circumstances. Few people enjoy
resolving problems through violence, but other routes to participation
and expression are blocked, while the system appears to allow for
successful street protests. Demonstrations in Xiamen, Dalian and Shifang
all produced fairly positive outcomes.

Just like the environmental movement itself, local governments' ideas
and methods for handling these incidents are as yet unformed. Stability
does not mean the absence of political conflict or social movements, but
the state working to bring that conflict within the system. But,
regrettably, local governments often exclude interested parties from the
decision-making process, and fail to communicate when conflict worsens.
Often, they escalate the conflict. This is clear in the forceful methods
some authorities have used to preserve stability, suppressing voices of
opposition and branding opponents enemies.

One example is the way in which local governments tend to blame street
protests triggered by environmental concerns on "small gangs" or
"ill-informed members of the public", acting on "ulterior motives".
These are usually false accusations which make the protestors out to be
either wrongheaded, or fools who have been incited to cause trouble, and
can only result in more opposition. Moreover, this approach provides the
local government with an excuse to mobilise the police, which does
nothing to solve the problem. Both sides use more extreme methods and
the situation escalates.

With major problems in the structures and processes of local governance,
there are no clear and mutually accepted rules of discussion. This was
true in the cases in Xiamen, Dalian and Shifang, at all stages of the
process - the initial decision-making, the growth of opposition,
interaction between the public and officials, worsening conflict and the
ultimate resolution.

In the end, street protests, bordering on violence, were used as a means
of expression and resolution. Thankfully, there was no bloodshed in
Shifang, but there are no guarantees that will be the case next time
around. Before we see serious violence, before true enmity takes root,
we need a fresh start for China's social governance.

Hard decisions must be taken to reform the political system, to face up
to the people's desire for political participation, to use methods such
as democratic elections to rein in local government's untrammelled
economic development. If they are not, then we face social collapse
caused by pollution, the yawning wealth gap, a lack of public services
and pessimism. The growth of environmental protests is a final warning.
It is time for social reform.



Tang Hao is deputy professor at South China Normal University, a
Fulbright scholar and a chinadialogue columnist.
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Myanmar in the dark over hydropower for Asia

http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/myanmar-in-the-dark-over-hydropower-for-asia/

Myanmar in the dark over hydropower for Asia
Tue, 24 Jul 2012 10:51 GMT

BANGKOK (AlertNet) - On a hot, humid evening in late May, hundreds of
people holding candles gathered in the city of Mandalay to protest
over power cuts, in the largest demonstration since Myanmar�s army
crushed the monk-led �Saffron Revolution� nearly five years ago.

The protests spread quickly to Yangon as six-hour daily blackouts hit
Myanmar�s commercial centre, even though it is better served than the
rest of the country.

�China, give back our electricity,� appealed one demonstrator�s
placard, while another warned in English, �Thailand, India, especially
China. Don�t steal our electrical source.�

The protestors questioned why Myanmar, among Asia's poorest nations,
is selling natural gas to Thailand and exporting hydroelectric power
to China while its own people live in darkness.

Myanmar has abundant energy resources, yet 74 percent of its 60
million people have no access to electricity, giving it one of the
lowest domestic energy consumption rates in the region, according to a
recent report by the Asian Development Bank.

Meanwhile, natural gas coming from, or passing through, Myanmar
accounts for about 30 percent of Thailand's energy consumption. And by
the end of August 2011, China had imported almost 5 billion kilowatt-
hours of electricity from two hydropower stations in Myanmar,
according to a Chinese government report.

Participants in the recent protests were particularly angry about
plans to build several dozen hydropower dams on Myanmar�s rivers,
fearing they could wreck livelihoods and food security.

============================================

� Water maps spark concern about "liquid gold rush"
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SIWI analysts
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============================================

�The rivers are critically important for Burma - culturally,
religiously, economically,� said Sean Turnell, an expert on Myanmar at
Australia's Macquarie University, referring to the country by its
former name.

�An awful lot of people get their living from these rivers, either
explicitly or implicitly. They're absolutely central to economic life
in Burma,� he told AlertNet.

Local press splashed pictures of the demonstrations on their front
pages and penned editorials questioning a series of billion-dollar
energy deals, testing the waters after a reformist government took
power in March 2011 ending half a century of authoritarian military
rule.

ASIA�S NEW EL DORADO

The current government has pledged to promote �people-centred
development�. But the protests - which ended relatively peacefully
after two weeks - highlight the unpopularity of the hydropower
projects, most of which were agreed by the previous regime with its
biggest ally, China.

Chinese firms are expected to build and run 33 of the 45 or so
hydropower plants scheduled for Myanmar, with Thailand and India
holding stakes in the rest. Almost all the power generated would be
exported to those countries.

With a land area the size of England and France combined and rich in
natural resources, Myanmar is shedding its reputation as a pariah
state and fast becoming Asia�s latest El Dorado.

Now that most international sanctions have been suspended and a
for..., investors are jostling to make up for lost time.

But there is growing resentment among ordinary Burmese that their
country�s natural resources �in this case, its rivers - could be
harnessed, and possibly damaged, to boost development elsewhere.

Burmese environmental activist Maw Htun Aung said the hydopower
schemes would change the flow of rivers, destroy fisheries and harm
agriculture, which employs 75 percent of the population. Few local
jobs would be created as Myanmar has little expertise in building and
maintaining large dams, he added.

�To push on with these projects without really understanding the costs
is like a blind (person) not being afraid of ghosts,� he said.

There are signs the goverment may be starting to open its eyes. In
September, President Thein Sein suspended the Chinese-led Myitsone
dam, Myanmar's largest hydropower project, after weeks of rare public
outrage. Located at the source of the Irrawaddy River in northern
Myanmar, the dam would flood an area roughly as large as Singapore.

And in a June speech on reforms, the president acknowledged the
protests over energy, and hinted at moving beyond reliance on dams for
electricity.

CANDLES IN THE SHADOW OF DAMS

Large dams are the wrong solution for Myanmar�s energy needs, argues
Grace Mang, China programme director for the environmental group
International Rivers.

�The Myitsone dam won�t power Kachin communities but growth in
Southern China,� Mang told AlertNet. �Many people in Burma are still
using candles, and they need decentralised energy because grid
infrastructure is quite expensive for a developing country.�

The Asian Development Bank says Myanmar has vast renewable energy
resources, but they have yet to be utilised to provide domestic power.

International Rivers has been able to verify progress on only 20 hydro
projects in the past 18 months, suggesting some agreements could
lapse. But Chinese companies are unlikely to walk away at the first
sign of trouble because the potential profits are too big, Mang said.

Most of the dams are due to be built in areas that are home to ethnic
groups and could cause decades-old conflicts to flare, she said,
pointing to renewed fighting between the military and the rebel Kachin
Independence Army (KIA) in northern Myanmar near the Chinese-backed
Dapein dams.

According to the Burma Rivers Network, the army sent in troops to
secure the dam sites, inflaming tensions with the KIA. Clashes erupted
in June 2011, and an estimated 75,000 people have since been displaced.

RESOURCE CURSE?

The urgency and secrecy shrouding energy deals in Myanmar is fuelling
concerns it will suffer the resource curse that afflicts many
developing countries where elites get rich on natural resource
exploitation while the vast majority stay poor.

�There's a very real danger and, in fact, one could argue that a
resource curse is already in play in Burma, particularly with respect
to the flows of natural gas,� said Macquarie University�s Turnell.

�It's a particularly big issue for Burma because it's got immense
water resources compared to other countries in Southeast Asia,� he
added.

Maw Htun Aung said the government is neglecting other areas of the
economy, including manufacturing, agriculture and fisheries.

�It is focusing on easy money from natural resource exploitation
instead,� he said.

The country�s natural assets, including its water, are being sold off
in a �fire sale�, he added.

�What's scary is that we're not building these dams one by one but
simultaneously. If they all turn out to be bad, future generations
will have to bear the burden for decades,� he warned.
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Thirsty South Asia's river rifts threaten "water wars"/Reuters

(Second related piece w/ more global perspective at end)

http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/07/23/water-south-asia-war-idINDEE86M06H20120723?feedType=RSS&feedName=globalCoverage2

Thirsty South Asia's river rifts threaten "water wars"
By Nita Bhalla

Jul 23, 2012 4:51pm IST

KANZALWAN, India-Pakistan Line of Control (AlertNet) - As the silver
waters of the Kishanganga rush through this north Kashmir valley,
labourers are hard at work on a hydropower project that will dam the
river just before it flows across one of the world's most heavily
militarised borders into Pakistan.

The hum of excavators echoes through the pine-covered valley, clearing
masses of soil and boulders, while army trucks crawl through the steep
Himalayan mountain passes.

The 330-MW dam is a symbol of India's growing focus on hydropower but
also highlights how water is a growing source of tension with
downstream Pakistan, which depends on the snow-fed Himalayan rivers
for everything from drinking water to agriculture.

Islamabad has complained to an international court that the dam in the
Gurez valley, one of dozens planned by India, will affect river flows
and is illegal. The court has halted any permanent work on the river
for the moment, although India can still continue tunneling and other
associated projects.

In the years since their partition from British India in 1947, land
disputes have led the two nuclear-armed neighbours to two of their
three wars. Water could well be the next flashpoint.

"There is definitely potential for conflict based on water,
particularly if we are looking to the year 2050, when there could be
considerable water scarcity in India and Pakistan," says Michael
Kugelman, South Asia Associate at the Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars in Washington.

"Populations will continue to grow. There will be more pressure on
supply. Factor in climate change and faster glacial melt ... That
means much more will be at stake. So you could have a perfect storm
which conceivably could be some sort of trigger."

It's not just South Asia -- water disputes are a global phenomenon,
sparked by growing populations, rapid urbanisation, increased
irrigation and a rising demand for alternative power such as
hydroelectricity.

Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq quarrel over the waters of the Tigris and
Euphrates. The Jordan river divides Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and the
West Bank. Ten African countries begrudgingly share the Nile.

In Southeast Asia, China and Laos are building dams over the mighty
Mekong, raising tensions with downstream nations.

A U.S. intelligence report in February warned fresh water supplies are
unlikely to keep up with global demand by 2040, increasing political
instability, hobbling economic growth and endangering world food
markets.

A "water war" is unlikely in the next decade, it said, but beyond that
rising demand and scarcities due to climate change and poor management
will increase the risk of conflict.

See complete multimedia package at water.trust.org

For more humanitarian news visit www.trust.org/alertnet

MAJOR THREAT

That threat is possibly nowhere more apparent than in South Asia, home
to a fifth of humanity and rife with historical tensions, mistrust and
regional rivalries.

The region's three major river systems - the Indus, the Ganges and the
Brahmaputra - sustain India and Pakistan's breadbasket states and many
of their major cities including New Delhi and Islamabad, as well as
Bangladesh.

"South Asia is symbolic of what we are seeing in terms of water stress
and tensions across the world," says B.G. Verghese, author and analyst
at New Delhi's Centre for Policy Research.

The region is one of the world's most water-stressed, yet the
population is adding an extra 25 million people a year - South Asia's
per capita water availability has dropped by 70 percent since 1950,
says the Asian Development Bank.

The effect of climate change on glaciers and rainfall patterns may be
crucial.

"Most of the water that is used in Pakistan comes from glacial melt or
the monsoon," says Rafay Alam, an environmental lawyer and coordinator
of the water programme at Lahore University of Management Sciences.

The dry months of June-July offer a snapshot of the extreme water
crisis in the region.

Hospitals in New Delhi this year cancelled surgeries because they had
no water to sterilise instruments, clean operating theatres or even
wash hands. Swanky malls selling luxury brands were forced to switch
off air conditioners and shut toilets.

In Pakistan, the port town of Gwadar ran out of water entirely,
forcing the government to send two naval water tankers. Some
government flats in the garrison city of Rawalpindi have not had water
for weeks, said the local press.

India, as both an upper and lower riparian nation, finds itself at the
centre of water disputes with its eastern and western downstream
neighbours -- Bangladesh and Pakistan -- which accuse New Delhi of
monopolising water flows.

To the north and northeast, India fears the same of upstream China,
with which it fought a brief border war in 1962. Beijing plans a
series of dams over the Tsangpo river, called the Brahmaputra as it
flows into eastern India.

DAM DISPUTES

For India, damming its Himalayan rivers is key to generating
electricity, as well as managing irrigation and flood control.
Hydropower is a critical part of India's energy security strategy and
New Delhi plans to use part of it to reach about 40 percent of people
who are currently off the grid.

A severe power shortage is hitting factory output and rolling outages
are routine, further stifling an economy which is growing at its
slowest in years.

India's plans have riled Bangladesh, which it helped gain freedom from
Pakistan in 1971. Relations cooled partly over the construction of the
Farakka Barrage (dam) on the Ganges River which Dhaka complained to
the United Nations about in 1976. The issue remains a sore point even
now.

More recently, Bangladesh has opposed India's plans to dam the Teesta
and Barak rivers in its remote northeast.

But India's hydropower plans are most worrying for Pakistan.

Water has long been a source of stress between the two countries. The
line that divided them in 1947 also cleaved the province of Punjab,
literally the land of five rivers - the Sutlej, Beas, Ravi, Chenab and
Jhelum, all tributaries of the Indus - breaking up millenniums-old
irrigation systems.

India's latest hydro plans have fanned new tensions.

"Pakistan is extremely worried that India is planning to build a whole
sequence of projects on both the Chenab and Jhelum rivers ... and the
extent to which India then becomes capable of controlling water
flows," says Feisal Naqvi, a lawyer who works on water issues.

In recent years, political rhetoric over water has been on the rise in
Islamabad, and militant groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba have sought
to use the issue to whip up anti-India sentiments - accusing New Delhi
of "stealing water".

India brushes off such fears as paranoia and argues the dams won't
consume or store water but just delay flows, in line with a 1960
treaty that governs the sharing of Indus waters between the two
countries.

SINK OR SWIM

South Asia's water woes may have little to do with cross-border
disputes, however. Shortages appear to be rooted in wasteful and
inefficient water management practices, with India and Pakistan the
worst culprits, experts say.

"All these countries are badly managing their water resources, yet
they are experts in blaming other countries outside," says Sundeep
Waslekar, president of Strategic Foresight Group, a Mumbai-based think-
tank.

"It would be more constructive if they looked at what they are doing
at home, than across their borders."

Their water infrastructure systems, such as canals and pipes used to
irrigate farm lands, are falling apart from neglect. Millions of
gallons of water are lost to leakages every day.

The strain on groundwater is the most disturbing. In India, more than
60 percent of irrigated agriculture and 85 percent of drinking water
depend on it, says the World Bank. Yet in 20 years, most of its
aquifers will be in a critical condition.

Countries must improve water management, say experts, and share
information such as river flows as well as joint ventures on dam
projects such as those India is doing with Bhutan.

"Populations are growing, demand is increasing, climate change is
taking its toll and we are getting into deeper and deeper waters,"
says Verghese, author of 'Waters of Hope: Himalayan-Ganga cooperation
for a billion people'.

"You can't wait and watch. You have to get savvy and do something
about it. Why get locked into rhetoric? We need to cooperate. Unless
you learn to swim, you are dead."

(This story is part of a special multimedia report on water produced
by AlertNet, a global humanitarian news service run by Thomson Reuters
Foundation. Visit water.trust.org)

(Additional reporting by Rebecca Conway and Qasim Nauman in Islamabad
and Sheikh Mustaq in Srinagar; Editing by Raju Gopalakrishnan and
Sonya Hepinstall)

-------------------------------------------------------

FACTBOX-Regions where water disputes are fuelling tensions
Reuters
Jul 23, 2012
http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/07/23/water-conflicts-idINL6E8IGFRG20120723

July 23 (AlertNet) - Disputes over water are common around the world,
exacerbated by climate change, growing populations, rapid
urbanisation, increased irrigation and a rising demand for alternative
energy sources such as hydroelectricity.

Following are a few of the regions where competition for water from
major rivers systems is fuelling tension.

SOUTH ASIA

India is home to three major river systems -- the Ganges, Brahmaputra
and the Indus -- which support 700 million people. As an upstream
nation, it controls water flows to Bangladesh to the east and Pakistan
to the west. The Indus supplies some 80 percent of Pakistan's
irrigated land.

India and Pakistan are both building hydropower dams in disputed
Kashmir along Kishanganga river. Pakistan fears India's dams will
disrupt water flows.

India, for its part, is concerned that China is building dams along
the Tsangpo river, which runs into India as the Brahmaputra.

CENTRAL ASIA

Central Asia is one of the world's driest places, where, thanks to 70
years of Soviet planning, growing thirsty crops such as cotton and
grain remain the main source of income for most people.

Disputes over water use from the Syr Daria and Amu Daria rivers have
increased since independence in 1991. Problems are compounded by
rising nationalism and lack of progress on a regional approach to
replace Soviet-era systems of water management.

Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan need more water for growing
populations and farming, while economically weaker Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan want more control for hydropower and irrigation.

Afghanistan, linked to Central Asia by the Amu Daria, is claiming its
own share of the water.

NILE BASIN

The countries of the Nile basin are Egypt, Sudan, South Sudan,
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Kenya, Democratic Republic of Congo,
Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania.

Egypt and Sudan control more than 90 percent of the Nile's waters due
to colonial-era and other treaties but others in the basin want a
bigger share.

Demand for irrigation has risen, with millions of hectares leased for
large-scale farming. Dams have complicated access to water.

Water needs are expected to rise as the Nile basin population is
projected to reach 654 million by 2030, up from 372 million in 2005,
according to UN estimates.

TIGRIS-EUPHRATES RIVER SYSTEM

The Tigris-Euphrates basin is mainly shared by Turkey, Syria and Iraq,
with many Tigris tributaries originating in Iran.

Iraq, struggling with water shortages due to aridity and years of
drought, says hydroelectric dams and irrigation in Turkey, Iran and
Syria have reduced the water flow in both rivers.

Increasing desertification, especially in Iraq, is compounding
problems. A large amount of Euphrates' waters evaporate due to extreme
heat. Contamination from pesticides, discharge of untreated sewage and
excess salinity due to low water levels are all common.

Iraq, Syria and Iran want more equitable access and control from
Turkey, where almost 98 percent of Euphrates waters originate. Despite
some cooperation on common management, a final agreement has yet to be
reached.

JORDAN RIVER BASIN

The river basin is highly stressed due to aridity in Jordan, Israel
and Palestinian Territories.

All three discharge untreated or poorly treated sewage. The Mountain
Aquifer - a key fresh water source for West Bank Palestinians and
major Israeli cities - is threatened by decades of over-exploitation
and groundwater pollution.

Despite efforts to cooperate, agreements to share water resources are
complicated by the long-stalled Middle East peace process. Israel
dominates the Palestinian water economy.

MEKONG RIVER BASIN

Most Mekong countries, especially China, have been planning and
building hydropower dams since the late 1980s.

Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam argue that China diverts or
stores more than its fair share of water due to dam-building on the
Upper Mekong.

There is growing concern about serious environmental damage to
agriculture, fisheries and food security for some 60 million people
due to plans by Laos and Cambodia to build more than 10 dams along the
Lower Mekong.

Despite cooperation efforts by Cambodia, Thailand, Laos and Vietnam
through the Mekong River Commission, national interests are getting in
the way of joint river management.

Sources: Reuters, AlertNet, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies,
Brookings Institute, International Crisis Group, Nile Basin Research
Programme, GRAIN, UNDP

(This factbox is part of a special multimedia report on water produced
by AlertNet, a global humanitarian news service run by Thomson Reuters
Foundation. Visit water.trust.org) (Reporting by Astrid Zweynert;
Editing by Sonya Hepinstall)
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Nat'l Geographic on Nepal's micro hydro efforts

http://newswatch.nationalgeographic.com/2012/07/20/nepals-mountain-villages-tap-the-power-of-eternal-snows-with-micro-hydro/

Nepal�s Mountain Villages Tap the Power of �Eternal Snows� With Micro-
hydro
by Brian Handwerk in Growing Green Jobs on July 20, 2012

Nepal�s soaring, snowy mountain peaks are a source of awe. They�re
also a source of clean, life-altering power to the people who live in
their shadows.

The small Himalayan nation is promoting micro-hydro plants at the
village level to produce renewable electricity, and green jobs, for
citizens living far off the country�s limited power grid.

Nepal is a poor nation and its rural inhabitants are unlikely to have
access to electricity�less than 1/3rd of them do, according to the
United Nations Develeopment Program. Expansion of the conventional
power grid is unlikely in the near future. It�s already so strained
that power outages are common in urban centers, and major resources
would be needed to connect remote communities in mountainous terrain.

Meanwhile Nepal�s electric demand is growing at some 7 percent a year.
Those without power suffer health problems from cooking with dirty
fuels and a lack of medical facilities, limited educational
opportunities, and stagnant economic growth. Rural residents have long
burned biomass, dung that might have been used as crop-boosting
fertilizers or trees, the loss of which causes erosion and produces
carbon emissions.

But the Government of Nepal�s Alternative Energy Promotion Centre
(AEPC) is administering a micro-hydro program aimed at building
community-operated plants that can produce up to 100 kilowatts of
power. (Even the smallest conventional hydro dams product 100 times
that much). International organizations including the World Bank, and
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) help fund the program under
the auspices of Renewable Energy for Rural Livelihood (RERL), which
aims to amplify earlier successes in bringing small hydro power to
hundreds of people, village by village.

The Nepal Micro Hydropower Development Association, an umbrella
organization that represents 500-odd private firms currently in the
business of providing micro-hydro services in Nepal, estimates that
since the industry�s earliest beginnings in the 1960s some 2,200 micro-
hydro plants have been put into place that now provide electricity for
some 200,000 households.

They are sometimes able to do so more reliably than the country�s main
grid. �Even though I live in a remote place the services I get in the
village are better than Kathmandu,� one Nepalese villager testified in
a UNDP Nepal produced video describing the project.

Letting the River Run

Large-scale hydro projects aren�t always as green as they seem,
according to many critics. They flood lands and wreck riverine habitats.

But micro-hydro plants basically just divert flowing river water, with
no significant dams, and use the forces of gravity and falling water
to spin turbines that generate power before churning the water back
into the river for its journey downstream. In these �run of the river�
systems water is channeled off through small canals, stored briefly
in a settling tank to separate sediment, then dropped through a steep
pipeline that delivers it into a turbine. The juice produced by the
turning turbine is wired directly to local users.

The 323 operational RERL facilities alone now create more than 600
full-time equivalent jobs and about 2,600 people have been technically
trained on how to operate a facility. But micro-hydro�s employment
impact goes further and includes specialized training to help spread
electric access benefits throughout the community. Under the program
more than 34,000 people, including 15,000 women, have been trained in
larger efforts to develop capacity on renewable energy, manage local
micro-hydro units and cooperatives, and initiate other environmentally
related activities.

Nepal�s micro-hydro ventures are managed by community organizations
and all residents are urged to participate and help maintain the
systems, educate others in their use, and stoke the growth of other
opportunities provided by a reliable access to power. Shops, cottage
manufacturing industries, grain mills, restaurants, carpentry shops,
pump irrigation, and countless other ventures have spread the economic
benefits of initial investment in renewable micro-hydro power.

Other aspects of life have also dramatically improved, many villagers
say. Communication can be a challenge in areas where distances may be
measured in days walked. Radio, internet, and telephones have
alleviated these problems considerably. Medical facilities are also
better able to treat people locally and offer a much wider range of
essential health services.

Schools have benefited from modern learning tools�as well as simple
lighting for study. Tul Bahadur Thapa, a grade 3 student at Shree
Tribhuvan secondary school In Kharbang, western Nepal, told UNDP
officials about the advantages of his move to this micro-hydropowered
school.

�Here, there is a computer lab and my teachers use a projector to
teach math, science, and other subjects,� he said. �We use calculators
in computers. At times, we also play games on the computer.�

Today�s micro-hydro successes only scratch the surface. The power
source has massive potential in a land where snow and ice cover the
high peaks�and eventually run downhill as electricity-generating
water. The World Bank estimates that only 2 percent of Nepal�s micro-
hydro potential has been developed so far and that the total supply
from micro-hydro and larger dams alike could reach 83,000 megawatts.

Challenges to Micro-Hydro

But even as the practice grows there are problems with which to
contend. Costs can be steep for impoverished communities. Foreign and
domestic grant monies for the projects are provided by RERL and
managed through Community Energy Funds established by each Micro
Hydropower Facility Group. But communities are responsible for
covering up to 50 percent of the project costs.

Loans are issued to poor households or business people wishing to use
power for revenue-producing activities. Modest fees are also charged
for electrical use and returned to help cover project costs. Those who
are unable to pay or secure loans can contribute in kind or donate
labor like canal cleaning and repairing.

And as elsewhere in the world gains aren�t distributed equally in
Nepalese society. Agencies are striving to ensure that women and
minority groups like the �untouchable� Dalit peoples are full
participants in the benefits of these projects, lest they become
divisive and counterproductive within communities of �haves� and �have
nots.�

But micro-hydro�s benefits seem to far outweigh such concerns and
growth of the industry is moving forward apace. The UNDP estimates
that 15 percent of Nepal�s electricity will be generated from micro-
and mini-hydro (less than 1,000 kW) plants by the end of 2012. And the
agency also estimates that each new micro-hydro system built creates
40 new businesses, putting Nepalis to work at building a sustainable
economy with green energy from the Himalayas� eternal snows.
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World Bank criticised over Ethiopia-Kenya electricity plan

(This is one of a number of articles on this project.)

http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/07/13/world-bank-criticised-over-ethiopia-kenya-electricity-grid-plan/#axzz20ue31UuH

World Bank criticised over Ethiopia-Kenya electricity plan


July 13, 2012 7:30 pm by Andrew Bowman

The World Bank has approved loans worth $684m for the Eastern
Electricity Highway Project, which aims to transport Ethiopian power
to Kenya and beyond.

The project is part of a $1.3bn plan to open up an eastern African
power network, but has attracted controversy due to social and
environmental worries over the knock on effects of hydro-power in
Ethiopia.

The Bank�s International Development Association fund will provide
$243m to the government of Ethiopia and $441m to Kenya to finance the
construction of a 1,000km cross-border power line between the two
countries that is due to come online in 2018. Kenya is currently
seeking to import electricity to meet shortfalls, while Ethiopia hopes
to export its electricity surplus from new hydro-electricity projects
underway.

A spokesperson called it a �landmark transformational project [that]
will change the fundamentals of the power sector in East Africa.�
However, the loans have already generated criticism from human rights
groups.

Indeed, the World Bank itself previously declined to fund one of
Ethiopia�s leading hydroelectric projects on the Omo River after
concerns were raised over its social and environmental impact.

The New York-based non-governmental organisation Human Rights Watch
today accused the World Bank of contradicting its principles by
indirectly enabling the funding of the dams through the Highway
Project, having earlier in the week urged bank president Jim Yong Kim
to deny loans to the project.

Kenya has suffered from severe power shortages in recent times. In a
country tipped by the World Bank to reach middle income status in the
coming years, only 25 per cent of the population have access to
electricity. In rural areas, only 5 per cent of the population are
connected to the grid.

The expected expansion of the oil and gas industry in Kenya following
a flurry of recent discoveries would place further pressures on the
electricity system.

The Kenyan government�s Vision 2030 strategy for economic development
has set some ambitious targets to remedy the situation. It plans to
more than double power generation over the next six years, from the
current installed capacity of 1,533 megawatts to 3,750MW in 2018.
Their projection for the total new capacity to be added by 2030 is
18,920MW, of which 2,000MW would come from imports.

In contrast Ethiopia is seeking to become a major regional power
exporter. The state-owned Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation, the
country�s sole electricity provider, aims to increase its generation
capacity to 37,000MW. It intends to do so primarily through a series
of large hydro-electricity plants commissioned over the past three
years.

The World Bank has celebrated the Highway project as a step forward
for regional development. Jamal Saghir, the Bank�s Director of
Sustainable Development for the Africa Region said: �Once built, this
power line will be a symbol of Africa�s determination to solve its
energy crisis through cooperation in energy trade. It will be a
landmark in achieving more growth and less poverty in the region.�

However, the Ethiopian government�s new dams have aroused major
international controversy. In 2011 Unesco called for the construction
of the Gibe III dam on the Omo River in southern Ethiopia, which will
be the highest in Africa when finished, to be halted due to concerns
over its impact on Kenya�s Lake Turkana, a World Heritage site. The
previous year, the non-governmental organisation Survival
International claimed that Gibe III could make up to 200,000 people
dependent on food aid through its population displacement impact and
disruption to farming and fishing.

As reported in the FT last month, the World Bank, European Investment
Bank and African Development Bank were dissuaded from funding the
project, but the state-owned Industrial and Commercial bank of China
provided a $500m loan.

The $4.8bn Grand Renaissance dam on the Blue Nile has also created
controversy. With an expected capacity of 6000MW the Grand Renaissance
is Africa�s largest hydro-electricity project, and the stakes are
higher. Egyptian government officials have claimed that the dam would
create serious water shortages for their farmers. With similar
difficulties in gaining the support of the major international
development financiers, in 2011 the Ethiopian government began seeking
domestic support through an expansion in bond issuance.

A variety of NGOs are now accusing the World Bank of hypocrisy. In a
statement released today, a spokesperson from Human Rights Watch said,
�Indigenous communities in the Omo Valley are paying a terrible price
for the Gibe III dam. The World Bank should be standing firmly behind
its social and environmental policies rather than pretending that the
dam is unconnected to this project.�

Responding to the criticisms, Sarwat Hussain of the World Bank told
beyondbrics: �The big picture is that Ethiopia has 45,000MW of
hydroelectricity potential, of which only 4 per cent has been tapped.
Then next door you have fast growing Kenya which is energy strapped.

�If you are looking for economic security for East Africa, you can�t
do it without Ethiopia�s resources. Regional power sharing is
essential given only one in three Africans have access to electricity.�
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Two articles on China's role in African dam building

Two perspectives on Chinese dam building in Africa via chinadialogue;
sorry for x-postings.

--------------------------------
Why big dams don't work

Lori Pottinger, 11 July 2012
chinadialogue

http://www.thethirdpole.net/china-brings-dams-back-to-africa/

Yesterday, Mike Muller argued that China's investment in dams is good
news for Africa. Here, Lori Pottinger writes that large dams are
costly and destructive, but Chinese experience in renewables still has
a lot to offer.

The record of Africa's large dams is one of widespread environmental
destruction to the continent's major river systems, upon which
millions of people depend for their livelihoods; forcible resettlement
and human rights abuses; corruption and cost overruns.

Large dams across the continent have left a trail of
"development�induced poverty" in their wake. Project benefits have
been consistently overstated and inequitably shared.Africa's large
hydropower dams also disproportionately benefit industry and high-
income groups, and have done little to reduce energy poverty. Finally,
because African energy sectors are already excessively dependent on
large-dam hydropower for electricity supply, and because the majority
of Africans depend directly on rivers for their livelihoods, big dams
are increasing the continent's vulnerability to climate change.

Chinese banks and companies are heavily backing dam construction in
Africa, and have been involved in some very troublesome projects �
including the Merowe Dam in Northern Sudan, whose reservoir displaced
50,000 farmers from their lands near the fertile Nile River to harsh
desert resettlement camps; the 185-metre high Tekeze Dam in Ethiopia,
which experts believe will silt up so fast the project will quickly
become unviable; and now the Gibe III Dam in Ethiopia, considered
Africa's most destructive dam project, which will dry up Kenya's Lake
Turkana, the world's largest desert lake, and impact half a million
indigenous people in two countries.

China's policy of "non-interference" in the other countries' affairs
has resulted in Chinese support for African dam projects marred by
state-sponsored violence and other human-rights violations; major
environmental destruction; and a lack of transparency in every
respect. The majority of Africans rely on the natural environment for
their livelihoods; choosing to build more large dams in Africa will
cause greater ecological degradation, damage livelihoods and diminish
quality of life for many.

Africa clearly needs energy and water-supply development. But the type
and scale of development necessary to meet the needs of the poor is
considerably different to what is generally being planned for the
continent. African governments are seeking funding for billions of
dollars worth of large hydropower proposals and the expansion of
transmission lines serving primarily urban and industrial areas. Yet
80% o fAfrica's population lives in rural areas far from the grid.
Similarly, big storage dams are a costly and inflexible response to
the needs of the huge number of people now without a safe water supply
inAfrica. A new path is needed.

Too big to fail?

Large dams are often the major focus of energy development in many
poor countries, which can lead to an unbalanced and risky energy
supply, increased corruption, and huge debt burdens. Worse, these
projects often do little to increase energy access, because the bigger
challenge is to bring electricity lines to the rural majority, who
live in low-density villages far from national grids, and who cannot
afford to use enough electricity to justify the connections.

For example, the Mphanda Nkuwa Dam inMozambique is expected to cost at
least US$2 billion, in a country with a national income per capita of
about US$360. Most of the dam's electricity will be used by the
aluminum industry and neighbouring South Africa.

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has one of Africa's least
functional governments, but hopes to build the world's largest dam,
the Grand Inga, which could produce twice the power ofChina's Three
Gorges Dam. This mega-dam is expected to cost at least US$80 billion,
in a country with an average national income of US$106. The dam's
electricity could be exported as far away as Europe, yet there is no
viable plan to increase energy access in the DRC from this project.

While countries generally get richer as they increase their use of
modern energy, the trend goes the other way for countries that depend
on hydroelectricity. Of the world's 40 richest countries, only one is
more than 90% hydro-dependent; of the world's 40 poorest, 15 are more
than 90% hydro-dependent, and many of these are inAfrica. Numerous
hydro-dependent African countries have suffered drought-induced
blackouts and energy rationing in recent years.

Climate change is now altering hydrological cycles, which means that
historical data is no longer a reliable predictor of future
hydrological patterns. Many sub-Saharan countries are already over-
dependent on hydropower for their electricity, and many areas have
experienced increasingly crippling droughts that have sidelined
hydropower production and cost billions in lost production every year.

The Nile River provides just one example of a river basin vulnerable
to climate change that is also seeing huge growth in large hydro dams.
In its 2001 report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
stated that in the Nile River Basin, there has been "a reduction in
runoff of 20% between 1972 and 1987, corresponding to a general
decrease in precipitation in the tributary basins calculated � In
recent years there have been significant interruptions in hydropower
generation as a result of severe droughts."

Energy security means hydro-heavy African nations should diversify
power generation away from large hydropower, rather than deepening
their dependency. Diversifying the energy sector would help the
continent's climate-adaptation efforts in several key ways: it would
de-emphasise reliance on erratic rainfall for electricity; reduce
conflict over water resources; and protect river-based ecosystems and
the many benefits they bring. Similarly, most Africans would benefit
more from a localised water supply and improvements in their rain-fed
agricultural systems, rather than a massive increase in big dams for
water supply and irrigation.

A better path

Africa is ripe for a major, decentralised power roll-out of renewables
and small power plants, which would build local economies from the
ground up, not the top down.

Energy activists in Africa are pressing for energy choices that
directly alleviate the energy poverty of Africa's poor; that reduce
nations' vulnerability to climate change; and that are transparently
planned with public participation. Large hydropower dams do not meet
the first two criteria, and have never yet met the last.

Energy development that invests in the local energy sector and creates
skilled jobs for Africans should be prioritised. Decentralised,
renewable technologies such as wind, micro-hydro and solar power
specifically allow for higher rates of job creation and technology
transfer. For example, a 2003 report commissioned by South Africa's
Sustainable Energy and Climate Change Project conservatively estimated
that if South Africa set a target of generating 15% of its energy from
renewable sources by 2020, it would create 36,373 new jobs in the
country's energy sector � greater than the total employment of the
national energy utility, Eskom.

Africa has world-class solar potential, a vast belt of clean
geothermal reserves, strong winds, and great potential for micro-hydro
and no-dam hydro. A 2012 report by the European Commission Joint
Research Centre found that, for huge swaths of the continent, using
solar power or micro-hydro would be cheaper than expanding national
grid services. The continent's wind power potential is also tremendous
along its large coastlines. East Africa has the potential to generate
15,000 megawatts of geothermal energy. But most of these resources
remain almost completely untapped.

China has much experience with the kinds of solutions that would help
Africa's poor majority. Its experience in biogas digesters, solar
panels and solar water heating, clean stoves and wind turbines would
bring much greater value for meeting Africa's pressing development
needs than a massive investment in destructive large dams.

Lori Pottinger is director of International Rivers' Africa Program.


***

China brings dams back to Africa
Olivia Boyd, 10 July 2012
chinadialogue

Chinese investors have broken a boycott on investment in African dams
� and loosened the grip of the environment lobby. This is good news
for the continent, water expert Mike Muller tells Olivia Boyd.

Mike Muller is a South African water expert, engineer and writer on
development issues. He is also commissioner at South Africa's National
Planning Commission and a visiting professor at the University of the
Witwatersrand in Johannesburg; a member of the Global Water
Partnership's Technical Advisory Committee and an advisor to the UN
World Water Assessment Programme. He was previously director general
of South Africa's Department of Water Affairs and Forestry.

Olivia Boyd caught up with him on the sidelines of a water conference
in Oxford, where he was speaking about China's role in African
hydropower development.

Olivia Boyd: You argue that China has broken an "investment boycott"
when it comes to hydropower in Africa. Can you explain what that
means? What was the boycott, and what caused it?

Mike Muller: The multilateral organisations and a lot of the
bilaterals were essentially blocked from investing in large water
infrastructure because environmental concerns had dominated the
agenda. Western NGOs had actually constrained lending policy This is
well-documented in the case of the World Bank, but equally true for a
lot of other agencies.

The arrival ofChinaas a significant investor in Africa has seen the
emergence of a bilateral discussion about China's interests and
[African] national interests. And quite often out of that, power
constraints have been identified as a priority, together with the
opportunity to address those power constraints through hydropower.

The rash of projects that have been identified as soon as that
opportunity opened is impressive and provides empirical evidence of
the obstructions that existed before. The evidence is compelling that
that it was Chinese engagement that has succeeded in removing the
obstructions. As a consequence, you now see some of the other
multilaterals, like the World Bank in Cameroon, relaxing what were
previously very onerous conditions, and beginning to invest in water
infrastructure again.

OB: What were the impacts of the boycott, in your view?

MM: It essentially ensured that Africa stayed underdeveloped in terms
of cheap and reliable and green hydropower. The figures show that
Africais the continent which has the least of its hydro-potential
developed. And in many countries, as in the case of the Bujagali dam
in Uganda, that opportunity � by far the most sensible approach to
energy development � just wasn't available because the finance
required couldn't be supported from local countries and had to be
sourced from multilaterals and they wouldn't give it.

In the case of Bujagali, there was a five-year delay [before it could
move ahead]. We know electricity deficits caused a 2% GDP drop over
that period. We can track what the GDP drop did to poverty rates. We
can track what the poverty rates did to infant mortality. And I think
it's reasonable to say that inUganda, on that one project, 10,000
children died because the country was prevented from using the best
available energy source.

OB: You say Chinese investors in Africa have broken this damaging
pattern, but they have also come under attack � for riding roughshod
over local interests, ignoring environment and labour standards, tying
up with harmful regimes. Are such criticisms invalid? Is Chinese
investment purely positive?

MM: No, but I think that Chinese investment has very clear rules. The
rules seem to be that "we will talk to you as partners, and we will
respect your preferences and your ideas". Now, if you have a regime
that doesn't care very much about labour standards or environmental
standards, or indeed care about the quality of work done, you'll get
poor infrastructure and you'll probably get poor performance. I think
what this does is throw the responsibility back onto Africans and
their governments to decide what they want and then to argue about how
to get it.

So I don't think that all Chinese projects are good by any means. I've
driven on some fairly appalling Chinese-built roads in various parts
of the [African] continent. But equally, where countries have decided
they want a good road, they've got a very good road. And I think what
the Chinese relationship is doing, which is what the aid-effectiveness
relationship is supposed to do more globally, is forcing countries to
take responsibility for the outcomes that they get, rather than
protecting them from themselves, which just enables them to always
blame outsiders for their problems rather than looking to themselves
for the changes that they need to make.

OB: You have complained about a single-minded focus on environmental
concerns and that worries about a particular Environmental Impact
Assessment, for instance, can end up delaying a project. Presumably
your solution isn't to do away with EIAs, so how do you get the right
balance between environmental concerns and other concerns?

MM: I think that environmental protection, and more substantively the
achievement of more environmentally sustainable economic and social
arrangements, is a priority. We always forget that the Environmental
Impact Assessment was originally supposed to be an environmental and
social impact assessment. We've seen that the social element has
largely been lost. You never hear a substantive argument about the
livelihood benefits of a project, you always hear about the
environmental benefits and impacts.

And my concern is that we need to rebalance the discussion to ensure
that the loud voices of environmental advocates are heard, but are
balanced by equally loud advocates for social equity, which is very
important as well as for economic growth, which is a critical enabler
of social development. And I think we've lost that.

The Bujagali dam, for me, is just one extreme case where that has
occurred.

OB: In China and elsewhere, many say one way to alleviate
environmental pressures is to shift to small-scale hydropower as
opposed to large-scale dams. What are your views on that?

MM: The evidence is that the proliferation of small-scale activity
can do as much, and quite often more, damage than large-scale
projects. InSouth Africa, we ban the construction of large numbers of
small dams in some areas, because of the water inefficiency that they
introduce, because of the additional evaporation. We know that problem
has been identified inIndiaas well.

So I think that "small versus large" is a complete red herring. You
need to look then at the impact of a thousand small activities, and
they are much more difficult to control and they are much more likely
to be sub-optimal.

I recently visited the Three Gorges. I visited it when it was under
construction and I've now visited when it was in operation. Quite
frankly, I think in terms of scale, in terms of the amount of green
energy you're getting, in terms of the improved transport
efficiencies, in terms of flood control, in terms of all sorts of
economic benefits, in terms of the local tourism and employment
benefits, you can really look at that project and say look at the
costs and look at the benefits. And those kinds of costs and benefits
would probably not have been achieved in small-scale projects in the
same way that they were achieved there.

"Small versus large" is an important discussion to have. But I think
it would be more useful to look substantively at those three pillars
� the social, the economic and the environmental � and try to make
sure that they are balanced. And my impression is that China has made
huge strides in 10 years towards rebalancing their water resource
management discussion and I would be very sad to see them moving in
the direction of too great a focus on environment. Particularly if
that's then going to impact on their partner countries.

I find it interesting, and there is empirical evidence, that China's
re-focus has completely changed the dams and development debate. The
anti-dam advocates are now turning most of their attention to China.
They are very concerned about China, they are trying to influence it.
I think we should be celebrating China's contribution to African
development in particular, even as we warn about the dangers of
careless project implementation.

Again, in the debates about China's policy, we need to celebrate the
very many benefits that we are getting from it, as well as being
careful about the potential damage that it could do, if not properly
managed. But the responsibility for that lies primarily with the
African partners. And China must demand accountability and
responsibility from its African partners and vice versa.

OB: So would that be your message to Chinese investors then? Demand
accountability?

MM: Demand accountability, yes. And if you don't get it think about
the consequences for yourself, and perhaps help your African partners
to think through what that means for both parties.

Olivia Boyd is managing editor at chinadialogue.
________________________________________________

This is International Rivers' mailing list on China's global
footprint, and particularly Chinese investment in
international dam projects.

You received this message as a subscriber on the list: chinaglobal@list.internationalrivers.org

To be removed from the list, please visit:
http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/o/2486/unsubscribe.jsp
________________________________________________

You received this message as a subscriber on the list: africa@list.internationalrivers.org

To be removed from the list, please visit:
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and

[Two perspectives on Chinese dam building in Africa via chinadialogue]

Why big dams don't work
Lori Pottinger, 11 July 2012
chinadialogue
http://www.thethirdpole.net/china-brings-dams-back-to-africa/

Yesterday, Mike Muller argued that China's investment in dams is good
news for Africa. Here, Lori Pottinger writes that large dams are costly
and destructive, but Chinese experience in renewables still has a lot to
offer.

The record of Africa's large dams is one of widespread environmental
destruction to the continent's major river systems, upon which millions
of people depend for their livelihoods; forcible resettlement and human
rights abuses; corruption and cost overruns.

Large dams across the continent have left a trail of
"development�induced poverty" in their wake. Project benefits have been
consistently overstated and inequitably shared.Africa's large hydropower
dams also disproportionately benefit industry and high-income groups,
and have done little to reduce energy poverty. Finally, because African
energy sectors are already excessively dependent on large-dam hydropower
for electricity supply, and because the majority of Africans depend
directly on rivers for their livelihoods, big dams are increasing the
continent's vulnerability to climate change.

Chinese banks and companies are heavily backing dam construction in
Africa, and have been involved in some very troublesome projects �
including the Merowe Dam in Northern Sudan, whose reservoir displaced
50,000 farmers from their lands near the fertile Nile River to harsh
desert resettlement camps; the 185-metre high Tekeze Dam in Ethiopia,
which experts believe will silt up so fast the project will quickly
become unviable; and now the Gibe III Dam in Ethiopia, considered
Africa's most destructive dam project, which will dry up Kenya's Lake
Turkana, the world's largest desert lake, and impact half a million
indigenous people in two countries.

China's policy of "non-interference" in the other countries' affairs has
resulted in Chinese support for African dam projects marred by
state-sponsored violence and other human-rights violations; major
environmental destruction; and a lack of transparency in every respect.
The majority of Africans rely on the natural environment for their
livelihoods; choosing to build more large dams in Africa will cause
greater ecological degradation, damage livelihoods and diminish quality
of life for many.

Africa clearly needs energy and water-supply development. But the type
and scale of development necessary to meet the needs of the poor is
considerably different to what is generally being planned for the
continent. African governments are seeking funding for billions of
dollars worth of large hydropower proposals and the expansion of
transmission lines serving primarily urban and industrial areas. Yet 80%
o fAfrica's population lives in rural areas far from the grid.
Similarly, big storage dams are a costly and inflexible response to the
needs of the huge number of people now without a safe water supply
inAfrica. A new path is needed.

Too big to fail?

Large dams are often the major focus of energy development in many poor
countries, which can lead to an unbalanced and risky energy supply,
increased corruption, and huge debt burdens. Worse, these projects often
do little to increase energy access, because the bigger challenge is to
bring electricity lines to the rural majority, who live in low-density
villages far from national grids, and who cannot afford to use enough
electricity to justify the connections.

For example, the Mphanda Nkuwa Dam inMozambique is expected to cost at
least US$2 billion, in a country with a national income per capita of
about US$360. Most of the dam's electricity will be used by the aluminum
industry and neighbouring South Africa.

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has one of Africa's least
functional governments, but hopes to build the world's largest dam, the
Grand Inga, which could produce twice the power ofChina's Three Gorges
Dam. This mega-dam is expected to cost at least US$80 billion, in a
country with an average national income of US$106. The dam's
electricity could be exported as far away as Europe, yet there is no
viable plan to increase energy access in the DRC from this project.

While countries generally get richer as they increase their use of
modern energy, the trend goes the other way for countries that depend on
hydroelectricity. Of the world's 40 richest countries, only one is more
than 90% hydro-dependent; of the world's 40 poorest, 15 are more than
90% hydro-dependent, and many of these are inAfrica. Numerous
hydro-dependent African countries have suffered drought-induced
blackouts and energy rationing in recent years.

Climate change is now altering hydrological cycles, which means that
historical data is no longer a reliable predictor of future hydrological
patterns. Many sub-Saharan countries are already over-dependent on
hydropower for their electricity, and many areas have experienced
increasingly crippling droughts that have sidelined hydropower
production and cost billions in lost production every year.

The Nile River provides just one example of a river basin vulnerable to
climate change that is also seeing huge growth in large hydro dams. In
its 2001 report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change stated
that in the Nile River Basin, there has been "a reduction in runoff of
20% between 1972 and 1987, corresponding to a general decrease in
precipitation in the tributary basins calculated � In recent years there
have been significant interruptions in hydropower generation as a result
of severe droughts."

Energy security means hydro-heavy African nations should diversify power
generation away from large hydropower, rather than deepening their
dependency. Diversifying the energy sector would help the continent's
climate-adaptation efforts in several key ways: it would de-emphasise
reliance on erratic rainfall for electricity; reduce conflict over water
resources; and protect river-based ecosystems and the many benefits they
bring. Similarly, most Africans would benefit more from a localised
water supply and improvements in their rain-fed agricultural systems,
rather than a massive increase in big dams for water supply and irrigation.

A better path

Africa is ripe for a major, decentralised power roll-out of renewables
and small power plants, which would build local economies from the
ground up, not the top down.

Energy activists in Africa are pressing for energy choices that directly
alleviate the energy poverty of Africa's poor; that reduce nations'
vulnerability to climate change; and that are transparently planned with
public participation. Large hydropower dams do not meet the first two
criteria, and have never yet met the last.

Energy development that invests in the local energy sector and creates
skilled jobs for Africans should be prioritised. Decentralised,
renewable technologies such as wind, micro-hydro and solar power
specifically allow for higher rates of job creation and technology
transfer. For example, a 2003 report commissioned by South Africa's
Sustainable Energy and Climate Change Project conservatively estimated
that if South Africa set a target of generating 15% of its energy from
renewable sources by 2020, it would create 36,373 new jobs in the
country's energy sector � greater than the total employment of the
national energy utility, Eskom.

Africa has world-class solar potential, a vast belt of clean geothermal
reserves, strong winds, and great potential for micro-hydro and no-dam
hydro. A 2012 report by the European Commission Joint Research Centre
found that, for huge swaths of the continent, using solar power or
micro-hydro would be cheaper than expanding national grid services. The
continent's wind power potential is also tremendous along its large
coastlines. East Africa has the potential to generate 15,000 megawatts
of geothermal energy. But most of these resources remain almost
completely untapped.

China has much experience with the kinds of solutions that would help
Africa's poor majority. Its experience in biogas digesters, solar panels
and solar water heating, clean stoves and wind turbines would bring much
greater value for meeting Africa's pressing development needs than a
massive investment in destructive large dams.

Lori Pottinger is director of International Rivers' Africa Program.


***

China brings dams back to Africa
Olivia Boyd, 10 July 2012
chinadialogue

Chinese investors have broken a boycott on investment in African dams �
and loosened the grip of the environment lobby. This is good news for
the continent, water expert Mike Muller tells Olivia Boyd.

Mike Muller is a South African water expert, engineer and writer on
development issues. He is also commissioner at South Africa's National
Planning Commission and a visiting professor at the University of the
Witwatersrand in Johannesburg; a member of the Global Water
Partnership's Technical Advisory Committee and an advisor to the UN
World Water Assessment Programme. He was previously director general of
South Africa's Department of Water Affairs and Forestry.

Olivia Boyd caught up with him on the sidelines of a water conference in
Oxford, where he was speaking about China's role in African hydropower
development.

Olivia Boyd: You argue that China has broken an "investment boycott"
when it comes to hydropower in Africa. Can you explain what that means?
What was the boycott, and what caused it?

Mike Muller: The multilateral organisations and a lot of the bilaterals
were essentially blocked from investing in large water infrastructure
because environmental concerns had dominated the agenda. Western NGOs
had actually constrained lending policy This is well-documented in the
case of the World Bank, but equally true for a lot of other agencies.

The arrival ofChinaas a significant investor in Africa has seen the
emergence of a bilateral discussion about China's interests and
[African] national interests. And quite often out of that, power
constraints have been identified as a priority, together with the
opportunity to address those power constraints through hydropower.

The rash of projects that have been identified as soon as that
opportunity opened is impressive and provides empirical evidence of the
obstructions that existed before. The evidence is compelling that that
it was Chinese engagement that has succeeded in removing the
obstructions. As a consequence, you now see some of the other
multilaterals, like the World Bank in Cameroon, relaxing what were
previously very onerous conditions, and beginning to invest in water
infrastructure again.

OB: What were the impacts of the boycott, in your view?

MM: It essentially ensured that Africa stayed underdeveloped in terms of
cheap and reliable and green hydropower. The figures show that Africais
the continent which has the least of its hydro-potential developed. And
in many countries, as in the case of the Bujagali dam in Uganda, that
opportunity � by far the most sensible approach to energy development �
just wasn't available because the finance required couldn't be supported
from local countries and had to be sourced from multilaterals and they
wouldn't give it.

In the case of Bujagali, there was a five-year delay [before it could
move ahead]. We know electricity deficits caused a 2% GDP drop over that
period. We can track what the GDP drop did to poverty rates. We can
track what the poverty rates did to infant mortality. And I think it's
reasonable to say that inUganda, on that one project, 10,000 children
died because the country was prevented from using the best available
energy source.

OB: You say Chinese investors in Africa have broken this damaging
pattern, but they have also come under attack � for riding roughshod
over local interests, ignoring environment and labour standards, tying
up with harmful regimes. Are such criticisms invalid? Is Chinese
investment purely positive?

MM: No, but I think that Chinese investment has very clear rules. The
rules seem to be that "we will talk to you as partners, and we will
respect your preferences and your ideas". Now, if you have a regime that
doesn't care very much about labour standards or environmental
standards, or indeed care about the quality of work done, you'll get
poor infrastructure and you'll probably get poor performance. I think
what this does is throw the responsibility back onto Africans and their
governments to decide what they want and then to argue about how to get it.

So I don't think that all Chinese projects are good by any means. I've
driven on some fairly appalling Chinese-built roads in various parts of
the [African] continent. But equally, where countries have decided they
want a good road, they've got a very good road. And I think what the
Chinese relationship is doing, which is what the aid-effectiveness
relationship is supposed to do more globally, is forcing countries to
take responsibility for the outcomes that they get, rather than
protecting them from themselves, which just enables them to always blame
outsiders for their problems rather than looking to themselves for the
changes that they need to make.

OB: You have complained about a single-minded focus on environmental
concerns and that worries about a particular Environmental Impact
Assessment, for instance, can end up delaying a project. Presumably
your solution isn't to do away with EIAs, so how do you get the right
balance between environmental concerns and other concerns?

MM: I think that environmental protection, and more substantively the
achievement of more environmentally sustainable economic and social
arrangements, is a priority. We always forget that the Environmental
Impact Assessment was originally supposed to be an environmental and
social impact assessment. We've seen that the social element has largely
been lost. You never hear a substantive argument about the livelihood
benefits of a project, you always hear about the environmental benefits
and impacts.

And my concern is that we need to rebalance the discussion to ensure
that the loud voices of environmental advocates are heard, but are
balanced by equally loud advocates for social equity, which is very
important as well as for economic growth, which is a critical enabler of
social development. And I think we've lost that.

The Bujagali dam, for me, is just one extreme case where that has occurred.

OB: In China and elsewhere, many say one way to alleviate environmental
pressures is to shift to small-scale hydropower as opposed to
large-scale dams. What are your views on that?

MM: The evidence is that the proliferation of small-scale activity can
do as much, and quite often more, damage than large-scale projects.
InSouth Africa, we ban the construction of large numbers of small dams
in some areas, because of the water inefficiency that they introduce,
because of the additional evaporation. We know that problem has been
identified inIndiaas well.

So I think that "small versus large" is a complete red herring. You need
to look then at the impact of a thousand small activities, and they are
much more difficult to control and they are much more likely to be
sub-optimal.

I recently visited the Three Gorges. I visited it when it was under
construction and I've now visited when it was in operation. Quite
frankly, I think in terms of scale, in terms of the amount of green
energy you're getting, in terms of the improved transport efficiencies,
in terms of flood control, in terms of all sorts of economic benefits,
in terms of the local tourism and employment benefits, you can really
look at that project and say look at the costs and look at the benefits.
And those kinds of costs and benefits would probably not have been
achieved in small-scale projects in the same way that they were achieved
there.

"Small versus large" is an important discussion to have. But I think it
would be more useful to look substantively at those three pillars � the
social, the economic and the environmental � and try to make sure that
they are balanced. And my impression is that China has made huge strides
in 10 years towards rebalancing their water resource management
discussion and I would be very sad to see them moving in the direction
of too great a focus on environment. Particularly if that's then going
to impact on their partner countries.

I find it interesting, and there is empirical evidence, that China's
re-focus has completely changed the dams and development debate. The
anti-dam advocates are now turning most of their attention to China.
They are very concerned about China, they are trying to influence it. I
think we should be celebrating China's contribution to African
development in particular, even as we warn about the dangers of careless
project implementation.

Again, in the debates about China's policy, we need to celebrate the
very many benefits that we are getting from it, as well as being careful
about the potential damage that it could do, if not properly managed.
But the responsibility for that lies primarily with the African
partners. And China must demand accountability and responsibility from
its African partners and vice versa.

OB: So would that be your message to Chinese investors then? Demand
accountability?

MM: Demand accountability, yes. And if you don't get it think about the
consequences for yourself, and perhaps help your African partners to
think through what that means for both parties.

Olivia Boyd is managing editor at chinadialogue.
________________________________________________

This is International Rivers' mailing list on China's global footprint, and particularly Chinese investment in
international dam projects.

You received this message as a subscriber on the list: chinaglobal@list.internationalrivers.org

To be removed from the list, please visit:
http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/o/2486/unsubscribe.jsp