Villagers count cost of Myanmar dam project
By Michael Peel in Paunglaung
Financial Times March 21, 2014
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/edc7a794-aff1-11e3-b0d0-00144feab7de.html?siteedition=intl#axzz2wdKPWI4H
The looming flood in Myanmar's Paunglaung river valley has forced
thousands of residents out to higher ground, leaving behind deserted
bamboo buildings where the only sign of life is the haunting toll of
cowbells.
A Chinese-backed dam downstream is due within months to shut its gates
and start submerging more than 20 villages here, in a project that will
power Myanmar's purpose-built capital city – and add to the dispute over
the fast-opening nation's future.
"We have never felt like this before," said Ma Khin Oo Wai, 24, whose
family had to leave their rice farm and are now making a living weaving
baskets and gathering wood in a new settlement up in the hills. "I don't
know what effect this will have on the country – but for our village
this is a serious setback."
Opponents of the Upper Paunglaung development and dozens of other
planned dams scattered around Myanmar claim the damage will be too great
and the benefits too small from this energy bonanza at one of Asia's
richest hydroelectric frontiers. However, supporters say the dams offer
an unpalatable but unavoidable answer to electricity shortages that
plague citizens and curb the ambitions of a nation emerging from decades
of insular military dictatorship.
"The economic development of this country is going to come at a huge
social and environmental cost," said Richard Horsey, an independent
Yangon-based analyst. "It's easy and nice to say these dams are bad,
which they are – but, at a certain point, the alternatives may be worse."
The Upper Paunglaung dam is part of the three-year-old quasi-civilian
government's strategy to focus on the country's little-exploited
estimated 100,000 megawatt hydroelectric potential, which is roughly
equivalent to the installed electricity capacity of the UK. Myanmar's
great waterways – including the Irrawaddy and Salween rivers – are seen
as a way to bridge a power gap that cripples companies with power losses
and has left more than four in five rural people without network
electricity, according to the Asian Development Bank.
But the plan has stuttered forward so far, with some projects delayed or
cast into doubt because they are in areas of conflict between the
government and ethnic militias. Many of the sites are shut off in
security zones guarded by a military put on still higher alert by
incidents such as a mysterious bomb attack in December that killed three
people not far from the planned Kunlong dam.
Other hydroelectric projects are provoking protest because some of their
production is likely to be sent to energy-hungry neighbours such as
Thailand and, especially, China. In a case that resonated nationwide,
the Myanmar government responded to demonstrations in 2011 by
indefinitely suspending work on the Myitsone dam in the far north of the
country, whose contractors included the state China Power Investment
Corporation.
"People in other regions protest against these projects and they are
postponed or cancelled," U Kyaw Mint, 49, a village head in the
Paunglaung river community of Khan Hla, or "Good Fortune" noted
wistfully. "But we say nothing and it goes ahead."
Upper Paunglaung's 140MW generating capacity is tiny compared with some
proposed dams – such as the towering 7,100MW Tasang – but the project
foreshadows some bigger brewing battles. Built by a consortium including
China's Yunnan Machinery Equipment Import & Export Company and AF Group
of Switzerland, it is the second in a pair of dams in an area of
spectacular beauty in the hinterland of the wide but still near-deserted
highways of Naypyidaw, capital since 2005.
The dam is a shock to local people who fish in the gently rippling
Paunglaung river or farm in the lee of the hills ripe with stories of
animist spirits, such as the region's fabled green ghosts. Relocated
farmers say the hillside areas they now till are much less accessible
and fertile than their former valley paddies, causing food shortages
they fear will worsen.
"I do not like that situation, as we will become bandits among us,"
lamented U Aye Maung, 59, who said he only had 40 bags of rice in store
for this year, barely half what his family needed. "Sometimes I foresee
that one house will steal from another – and I will also steal from
others, and we will hit each other with sticks and kill each other with
swords."
Villagers still nervous of criticising government after generations of
repression say they have been given some compensation, new land and a
water supply piped down from the mountains, but still have no network
electricity – and have access only to a basic school and no hospital.
"Government is like our father, and we can't go against our father,"
confided one local man, tacitly referencing the historic intimidation
and rights abuses locals and activists say took place after the then
military junta launched the Paunglaung project a decade ago. "But we
pray that maybe there are technical problems with this project, so that
the dam breaks."
Myanmar government officials point to the money and services already
delivered to the Paunglaung river communities and say more will follow.
The dam companies did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
For now, villagers in the Paunglaung area are waiting for the waters –
and wondering just what they will get back for a sacrifice that will be
demanded from more of their fellow citizens as their country changes.
"We heard that they will provide us electricity, but that will be the
only benefit for the village." said Moe Aung, 18, as he gathered with
friends clad in Arsenal, Liverpool and Barcelona shirts for a
valedictory football match on a pitch they have played on since
childhood. "Apart from that, the rest will be negative".
________________________________________________
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Friday, March 21, 2014
China rivers at the brink of collapse
China rivers at the brink of collapse
CGIAR Agriculture and Ecosystems Blog, March 21, 2014
by Peter Bosshard
http://wle.cgiar.org/blogs/2014/03/21/china-rivers-brink-collapse/
China's rulers have traditionally derived their legitimacy from
controlling water. The country ranks only sixth in terms of annual river
runoff, but counts half the planet's large dams within its borders. A
new report warns that dam building has brought China's river ecosystems
to the point of collapse.
Since the 1950s, China has dammed, straightened, diverted and polluted
its rivers in a rapid quest for industrialization. Many of these
projects had disastrous environmental, social and economic impacts. The
Sanmenxia Dam on the Yellow River for example flooded 660 square
kilometers of fertile land and displaced 410,000 people. Yet because it
silted up rapidly the project only generates power at one sixth of its
projected capacity.
In the new millennium, the Chinese government realized that its ruthless
dam building program threatened to undermine the country's long term
prosperity and stability. In 2004, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao suspended
dam construction on the Nu (Salween) and the Jinsha (upper Yangtze)
rivers, including a project on the magnificent Tiger Leaping Gorge. The
government created fisheries reserves and strengthened environmental
guidelines. In 2011, it even acknowledged the "urgent environmental
problems" of Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River, the world's largest
hydropower project.
The growing climate crisis ended the period of relative caution in
building dams. At the climate summit of Copenhagen in 2009, the Chinese
government committed to reduce the carbon intensity of its economy by
40-45% by 2020. As a consequence, the government launched a relentless
new dam building effort under its 12th Five-Year-Plan (2011-15).
The current plan commits to approving 160 megawatts of new hydropower
capacity by 2015 - more than any other country has built in its entire
history. It prioritizes 50 large hydropower plants on the Jinsha (upper
Yangtze), Yalong, Dadu, Lancang (upper Mekong), Yarlung Tsangpo
(Brahmaputra) and upper Yellow River. The plan also authorizes the
construction of five of the 13 dams on the Nu (Salween) River which the
government had stopped in 2004.
Alarmed by the pace of renewed dam building, experts from Chinese
environmental organizations have come together to prepare what they call
the "last report" on China's rivers. The report, which was completed in
February 2014, highlights four main problems with the current wave of
hydropower development:
. Dams are seriously degrading China's freshwater ecosystems. They
are drying up rivers and lakes, inundate fertile floodplains, and
compromise the capacity of rivers to clean themselves. As a result, the
Three Gorges and other reservoirs have been turned into waste dumps, at
times exploding in toxic algae blooms. The Chinese river dolphin, which
ploughed the waters of the Yangtze for 20 million years, has become
extinct, and other freshwater species are under threat. Fish sanctuaries
created to mitigate the impacts of dam building exist on paper only, or
have been curtailed to allow space for more dams.
. Dams impoverish poor communities further. According to former Prime
Minister Wen Jiabao, dam building has displaced 23 million people in
China. Displaced populations are frequently cheated and bullied by
corrupt local officials, and the promised jobs or replacement lands
often don't materialize. Land conflicts have become the primary cause of
social unrest in China. As dam building moves upstream into mountain
areas, ethnic minorities are particularly affected by displacement.
. Reservoirs are destabilizing geologically fragile river valleys,
create frequent landslides, and compound earthquake risks. Scientists
suggest that the Zipingpu Dam in Sichuan may have triggered the Wenchuan
earthquake, which killed at least 69,000 people in May 2008. Dam
cascades in the seismically active valleys of southwest China are a
particular concern for triggering and being impacted by earthquakes.
. The decision-making process is in disarray, and government
regulations are no match for the new dam building rush. Integrated river
basin plans and environmental impact assessments are almost always
carried out after dam construction starts. Large projects such as the
Xiluodu and Xiangjiaba dams even began their construction phase before
they received their final approval. In the face of such abuses, no
channels for effective public consultation and participation exist.
The authors of the new report point out that China's energy intensity is
7 times higher than Japan's and 2.8 higher than India's. Energy
intensive and polluting industries continue to suffer from
over-capacity. A less energy-intensive development path will be required
to relief the pressure on China's ecosystems. In the meantime, the
authors propose a system of "ecological redlines" that could protect
critical ecosystems from being dammed.
According to the first national water census carried out in 2013, China
lost 28,000 of its estimated 50,000 rivers within a few decades. The
"speed of current hydropower dam construction", the authors of the new
report warn, "will bring unexpected, irreversible and unbearable
consequences" to the country's remaining rivers. Unless the government
takes urgent action, the new report may become the epitaph for China's
rivers.
About the Author: Peter Bosshard is the Policy Director of International
Rivers.
This blog post is featured alongside responses to the question "Should
we build more large dams" as part of a series of responses for World
Water Day 2014 at
http://wle.cgiar.org/blogs/2014/03/21/asked-answered-build-large-dams/.
The new China rivers report is available at
www.internationalrivers.org/node/8262.
________________________________________________
You received this message as a subscriber on the list: china@list.internationalrivers.org
To be removed from the list, please visit:
http://org.salsalabs.com/o/2486/unsubscribe.jsp
CGIAR Agriculture and Ecosystems Blog, March 21, 2014
by Peter Bosshard
http://wle.cgiar.org/blogs/2014/03/21/china-rivers-brink-collapse/
China's rulers have traditionally derived their legitimacy from
controlling water. The country ranks only sixth in terms of annual river
runoff, but counts half the planet's large dams within its borders. A
new report warns that dam building has brought China's river ecosystems
to the point of collapse.
Since the 1950s, China has dammed, straightened, diverted and polluted
its rivers in a rapid quest for industrialization. Many of these
projects had disastrous environmental, social and economic impacts. The
Sanmenxia Dam on the Yellow River for example flooded 660 square
kilometers of fertile land and displaced 410,000 people. Yet because it
silted up rapidly the project only generates power at one sixth of its
projected capacity.
In the new millennium, the Chinese government realized that its ruthless
dam building program threatened to undermine the country's long term
prosperity and stability. In 2004, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao suspended
dam construction on the Nu (Salween) and the Jinsha (upper Yangtze)
rivers, including a project on the magnificent Tiger Leaping Gorge. The
government created fisheries reserves and strengthened environmental
guidelines. In 2011, it even acknowledged the "urgent environmental
problems" of Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River, the world's largest
hydropower project.
The growing climate crisis ended the period of relative caution in
building dams. At the climate summit of Copenhagen in 2009, the Chinese
government committed to reduce the carbon intensity of its economy by
40-45% by 2020. As a consequence, the government launched a relentless
new dam building effort under its 12th Five-Year-Plan (2011-15).
The current plan commits to approving 160 megawatts of new hydropower
capacity by 2015 - more than any other country has built in its entire
history. It prioritizes 50 large hydropower plants on the Jinsha (upper
Yangtze), Yalong, Dadu, Lancang (upper Mekong), Yarlung Tsangpo
(Brahmaputra) and upper Yellow River. The plan also authorizes the
construction of five of the 13 dams on the Nu (Salween) River which the
government had stopped in 2004.
Alarmed by the pace of renewed dam building, experts from Chinese
environmental organizations have come together to prepare what they call
the "last report" on China's rivers. The report, which was completed in
February 2014, highlights four main problems with the current wave of
hydropower development:
. Dams are seriously degrading China's freshwater ecosystems. They
are drying up rivers and lakes, inundate fertile floodplains, and
compromise the capacity of rivers to clean themselves. As a result, the
Three Gorges and other reservoirs have been turned into waste dumps, at
times exploding in toxic algae blooms. The Chinese river dolphin, which
ploughed the waters of the Yangtze for 20 million years, has become
extinct, and other freshwater species are under threat. Fish sanctuaries
created to mitigate the impacts of dam building exist on paper only, or
have been curtailed to allow space for more dams.
. Dams impoverish poor communities further. According to former Prime
Minister Wen Jiabao, dam building has displaced 23 million people in
China. Displaced populations are frequently cheated and bullied by
corrupt local officials, and the promised jobs or replacement lands
often don't materialize. Land conflicts have become the primary cause of
social unrest in China. As dam building moves upstream into mountain
areas, ethnic minorities are particularly affected by displacement.
. Reservoirs are destabilizing geologically fragile river valleys,
create frequent landslides, and compound earthquake risks. Scientists
suggest that the Zipingpu Dam in Sichuan may have triggered the Wenchuan
earthquake, which killed at least 69,000 people in May 2008. Dam
cascades in the seismically active valleys of southwest China are a
particular concern for triggering and being impacted by earthquakes.
. The decision-making process is in disarray, and government
regulations are no match for the new dam building rush. Integrated river
basin plans and environmental impact assessments are almost always
carried out after dam construction starts. Large projects such as the
Xiluodu and Xiangjiaba dams even began their construction phase before
they received their final approval. In the face of such abuses, no
channels for effective public consultation and participation exist.
The authors of the new report point out that China's energy intensity is
7 times higher than Japan's and 2.8 higher than India's. Energy
intensive and polluting industries continue to suffer from
over-capacity. A less energy-intensive development path will be required
to relief the pressure on China's ecosystems. In the meantime, the
authors propose a system of "ecological redlines" that could protect
critical ecosystems from being dammed.
According to the first national water census carried out in 2013, China
lost 28,000 of its estimated 50,000 rivers within a few decades. The
"speed of current hydropower dam construction", the authors of the new
report warn, "will bring unexpected, irreversible and unbearable
consequences" to the country's remaining rivers. Unless the government
takes urgent action, the new report may become the epitaph for China's
rivers.
About the Author: Peter Bosshard is the Policy Director of International
Rivers.
This blog post is featured alongside responses to the question "Should
we build more large dams" as part of a series of responses for World
Water Day 2014 at
http://wle.cgiar.org/blogs/2014/03/21/asked-answered-build-large-dams/.
The new China rivers report is available at
www.internationalrivers.org/node/8262.
________________________________________________
You received this message as a subscriber on the list: china@list.internationalrivers.org
To be removed from the list, please visit:
http://org.salsalabs.com/o/2486/unsubscribe.jsp
Thursday, March 20, 2014
Megadams: Battle on the Brahmaputra
BBC, 20 March 2014
Megadams: Battle on the Brahmaputra
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-26663820
China and India have their eye on the energy potential of the vast
Brahmaputra river. Will a new wave of "megadams" bring power to the
people - or put millions at risk? Navin Singh Khadka reports from Assam,
India.
On the banks of the Brahmaputra it is hard to get a sense of where the
river starts and ends. It begins far away as a Tibetan mountain stream.
On the floodplains of Assam, though, its waters spread as far as the eye
can see, merging with the horizon and the sky.
From here it continues through north-eastern India into Bangladesh,
where it joins with the Ganges to form a mighty river delta.
For centuries the Brahmaputra has nourished the land, and fed and
watered the people on its banks.
Today, though, India and China's growing economies mean the river is
increasingly seen as a source of energy. Both countries are planning
major dams on long stretches of the river.
In Assam the plans are being greeted with scepticism and some fear.
The fear is that dams upstream could give China great power over their
lives. And many in Assam worry whether China has honourable intentions.
After a landslide in China in 2000, the river was blocked for several
days, unknown to those downstream.
When the water forced its way past the blockage Assam faced an oncoming
torrent. There was no advance warning. There are concerns this could
happen more frequently.
Some also believe that China may divert water to its parched north - as
it has done with other southern rivers.
India's central government says China has given them assurances about
the new Tibetan dams.
"Our foreign ministry has checked with China and we have been told that
the flow will not be affected, and we will make sure that the people's
lives are not affected by the dams," Paban Singh Ghatowar, minister for
the development of north-eastern India, told the BBC.
Beijing says the dams it is building on the Tibetan stretch of the river
will ease power shortages for people in that region.
"All new projects will go through scientific planning and feasibility
studies and the impact to both upstream and downstream will be fully
considered," China's foreign ministry told the BBC.
It said three new dams at Dagu, Jiacha, and Jeixu were small-scale
projects: "They will not affect flood control or the ecological
environment of downstream areas," the foreign ministry said.
Despite the statements, there is no official water-sharing deal between
India and China - just an agreement to share monsoon flood data.
Experts and interest groups remain as sceptical as local residents.
"Rivers unite us, but dams divide us," says Peter Bosshard, of the
International Rivers Network.
He criticises India for ignoring the rights of Bangladesh even as it
deals with China's claim on the river.
"By engaging in a race to dam the Brahmaputra as quickly as possible,
China and India will cause cumulative environmental impacts beyond the
limits of the river's ecosystem, and will threaten the livelihoods of
more than 100 million people who depend on the river."
It is hard to know where the truth lies. The dams are hidden from view,
on remote valleys and in deep mountain gorges. It is there that the
never-ending tension between politics, development and environment is
now being played out.
"Start Quote:
By engaging in a race to dam the Brahmaputra as quickly as possible,
China and India will cause cumulative environmental impacts beyond the
limits of the river's ecosystem" Peter Bosshard, International Rivers
Network
________________________________________________
You received this message as a subscriber on the list: dams@list.internationalrivers.org
To be removed from the list, please visit:
http://org.salsalabs.com/o/2486/unsubscribe.jsp
Megadams: Battle on the Brahmaputra
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-26663820
China and India have their eye on the energy potential of the vast
Brahmaputra river. Will a new wave of "megadams" bring power to the
people - or put millions at risk? Navin Singh Khadka reports from Assam,
India.
On the banks of the Brahmaputra it is hard to get a sense of where the
river starts and ends. It begins far away as a Tibetan mountain stream.
On the floodplains of Assam, though, its waters spread as far as the eye
can see, merging with the horizon and the sky.
From here it continues through north-eastern India into Bangladesh,
where it joins with the Ganges to form a mighty river delta.
For centuries the Brahmaputra has nourished the land, and fed and
watered the people on its banks.
Today, though, India and China's growing economies mean the river is
increasingly seen as a source of energy. Both countries are planning
major dams on long stretches of the river.
In Assam the plans are being greeted with scepticism and some fear.
The fear is that dams upstream could give China great power over their
lives. And many in Assam worry whether China has honourable intentions.
After a landslide in China in 2000, the river was blocked for several
days, unknown to those downstream.
When the water forced its way past the blockage Assam faced an oncoming
torrent. There was no advance warning. There are concerns this could
happen more frequently.
Some also believe that China may divert water to its parched north - as
it has done with other southern rivers.
India's central government says China has given them assurances about
the new Tibetan dams.
"Our foreign ministry has checked with China and we have been told that
the flow will not be affected, and we will make sure that the people's
lives are not affected by the dams," Paban Singh Ghatowar, minister for
the development of north-eastern India, told the BBC.
Beijing says the dams it is building on the Tibetan stretch of the river
will ease power shortages for people in that region.
"All new projects will go through scientific planning and feasibility
studies and the impact to both upstream and downstream will be fully
considered," China's foreign ministry told the BBC.
It said three new dams at Dagu, Jiacha, and Jeixu were small-scale
projects: "They will not affect flood control or the ecological
environment of downstream areas," the foreign ministry said.
Despite the statements, there is no official water-sharing deal between
India and China - just an agreement to share monsoon flood data.
Experts and interest groups remain as sceptical as local residents.
"Rivers unite us, but dams divide us," says Peter Bosshard, of the
International Rivers Network.
He criticises India for ignoring the rights of Bangladesh even as it
deals with China's claim on the river.
"By engaging in a race to dam the Brahmaputra as quickly as possible,
China and India will cause cumulative environmental impacts beyond the
limits of the river's ecosystem, and will threaten the livelihoods of
more than 100 million people who depend on the river."
It is hard to know where the truth lies. The dams are hidden from view,
on remote valleys and in deep mountain gorges. It is there that the
never-ending tension between politics, development and environment is
now being played out.
"Start Quote:
By engaging in a race to dam the Brahmaputra as quickly as possible,
China and India will cause cumulative environmental impacts beyond the
limits of the river's ecosystem" Peter Bosshard, International Rivers
Network
________________________________________________
You received this message as a subscriber on the list: dams@list.internationalrivers.org
To be removed from the list, please visit:
http://org.salsalabs.com/o/2486/unsubscribe.jsp
Megadams: Battle on the Brahmaputra
BBC, 20 March 2014
Megadams: Battle on the Brahmaputra
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-26663820
China and India have their eye on the energy potential of the vast
Brahmaputra river. Will a new wave of "megadams" bring power to the
people - or put millions at risk? Navin Singh Khadka reports from Assam,
India.
On the banks of the Brahmaputra it is hard to get a sense of where the
river starts and ends. It begins far away as a Tibetan mountain stream.
On the floodplains of Assam, though, its waters spread as far as the eye
can see, merging with the horizon and the sky.
From here it continues through north-eastern India into Bangladesh,
where it joins with the Ganges to form a mighty river delta.
For centuries the Brahmaputra has nourished the land, and fed and
watered the people on its banks.
Today, though, India and China's growing economies mean the river is
increasingly seen as a source of energy. Both countries are planning
major dams on long stretches of the river.
In Assam the plans are being greeted with scepticism and some fear.
The fear is that dams upstream could give China great power over their
lives. And many in Assam worry whether China has honourable intentions.
After a landslide in China in 2000, the river was blocked for several
days, unknown to those downstream.
When the water forced its way past the blockage Assam faced an oncoming
torrent. There was no advance warning. There are concerns this could
happen more frequently.
Some also believe that China may divert water to its parched north - as
it has done with other southern rivers.
India's central government says China has given them assurances about
the new Tibetan dams.
"Our foreign ministry has checked with China and we have been told that
the flow will not be affected, and we will make sure that the people's
lives are not affected by the dams," Paban Singh Ghatowar, minister for
the development of north-eastern India, told the BBC.
Beijing says the dams it is building on the Tibetan stretch of the river
will ease power shortages for people in that region.
"All new projects will go through scientific planning and feasibility
studies and the impact to both upstream and downstream will be fully
considered," China's foreign ministry told the BBC.
It said three new dams at Dagu, Jiacha, and Jeixu were small-scale
projects: "They will not affect flood control or the ecological
environment of downstream areas," the foreign ministry said.
Despite the statements, there is no official water-sharing deal between
India and China - just an agreement to share monsoon flood data.
Experts and interest groups remain as sceptical as local residents.
"Rivers unite us, but dams divide us," says Peter Bosshard, of the
International Rivers Network.
He criticises India for ignoring the rights of Bangladesh even as it
deals with China's claim on the river.
"By engaging in a race to dam the Brahmaputra as quickly as possible,
China and India will cause cumulative environmental impacts beyond the
limits of the river's ecosystem, and will threaten the livelihoods of
more than 100 million people who depend on the river."
It is hard to know where the truth lies. The dams are hidden from view,
on remote valleys and in deep mountain gorges. It is there that the
never-ending tension between politics, development and environment is
now being played out.
"Start Quote:
By engaging in a race to dam the Brahmaputra as quickly as possible,
China and India will cause cumulative environmental impacts beyond the
limits of the river's ecosystem" Peter Bosshard, International Rivers
Network
________________________________________________
You received this message as a subscriber on the list: sasia@list.internationalrivers.org
To be removed from the list, please visit:
http://org.salsalabs.com/o/2486/unsubscribe.jsp
Megadams: Battle on the Brahmaputra
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-26663820
China and India have their eye on the energy potential of the vast
Brahmaputra river. Will a new wave of "megadams" bring power to the
people - or put millions at risk? Navin Singh Khadka reports from Assam,
India.
On the banks of the Brahmaputra it is hard to get a sense of where the
river starts and ends. It begins far away as a Tibetan mountain stream.
On the floodplains of Assam, though, its waters spread as far as the eye
can see, merging with the horizon and the sky.
From here it continues through north-eastern India into Bangladesh,
where it joins with the Ganges to form a mighty river delta.
For centuries the Brahmaputra has nourished the land, and fed and
watered the people on its banks.
Today, though, India and China's growing economies mean the river is
increasingly seen as a source of energy. Both countries are planning
major dams on long stretches of the river.
In Assam the plans are being greeted with scepticism and some fear.
The fear is that dams upstream could give China great power over their
lives. And many in Assam worry whether China has honourable intentions.
After a landslide in China in 2000, the river was blocked for several
days, unknown to those downstream.
When the water forced its way past the blockage Assam faced an oncoming
torrent. There was no advance warning. There are concerns this could
happen more frequently.
Some also believe that China may divert water to its parched north - as
it has done with other southern rivers.
India's central government says China has given them assurances about
the new Tibetan dams.
"Our foreign ministry has checked with China and we have been told that
the flow will not be affected, and we will make sure that the people's
lives are not affected by the dams," Paban Singh Ghatowar, minister for
the development of north-eastern India, told the BBC.
Beijing says the dams it is building on the Tibetan stretch of the river
will ease power shortages for people in that region.
"All new projects will go through scientific planning and feasibility
studies and the impact to both upstream and downstream will be fully
considered," China's foreign ministry told the BBC.
It said three new dams at Dagu, Jiacha, and Jeixu were small-scale
projects: "They will not affect flood control or the ecological
environment of downstream areas," the foreign ministry said.
Despite the statements, there is no official water-sharing deal between
India and China - just an agreement to share monsoon flood data.
Experts and interest groups remain as sceptical as local residents.
"Rivers unite us, but dams divide us," says Peter Bosshard, of the
International Rivers Network.
He criticises India for ignoring the rights of Bangladesh even as it
deals with China's claim on the river.
"By engaging in a race to dam the Brahmaputra as quickly as possible,
China and India will cause cumulative environmental impacts beyond the
limits of the river's ecosystem, and will threaten the livelihoods of
more than 100 million people who depend on the river."
It is hard to know where the truth lies. The dams are hidden from view,
on remote valleys and in deep mountain gorges. It is there that the
never-ending tension between politics, development and environment is
now being played out.
"Start Quote:
By engaging in a race to dam the Brahmaputra as quickly as possible,
China and India will cause cumulative environmental impacts beyond the
limits of the river's ecosystem" Peter Bosshard, International Rivers
Network
________________________________________________
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World Bank Grant for Inga 3 Dam Denounced as Support for Africa's Next White Elephant
World Bank Grant for Inga 3 Dam Denounced as Support for Africa's Next
White Elephant
International Rivers, March 20, 2014
www.internationalrivers.org/node/8272
Today, the World Bank Group Board of Directors approved a grant of $73
million for the Inga 3 Dam on the Congo River -€" the biggest hydropower
project the World Bank has ever funded. International Rivers denounces
the decision as support for a risky mega-project that will not benefit
the local population.
The 4800 megawatt Inga 3 Dam is the first phase of the giant Grand Inga
scheme in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Including the financing
costs, Inga 3 will cost $14 billion. The Bank's $73 million grant will
finance technical studies and legal work to prepare for the construction
of the dam, which is expected to start in 2016 and take seven years.
Even though only 9% of the DRC population has access to electricity, the
power generated by Inga 3 will primarily benefit mining companies and
export markets.
Rudo Sanyanga, the Africa Director of International Rivers, said: "By
approving Inga 3, the World Bank shows it has not learned lessons from
the bad experience of previous dams on the Congo River despite its
claims to the contrary. The Bank is turning a blind eye to the DRC's
poor governance and is taking short-cuts to the environmental assessment
of the project."
Peter Bosshard, the Policy Director of International Rivers, said:
"Solar, wind and micro-hydropower are more effective at reducing energy
poverty in Africa, and don't suffer the cost and time overruns that are
typical for large dams. We will continue to push the World Bank and the
DRC government to support clean local energy solutions rather than
Africa'€™s next white elephant."
On March 10, four researchers from Oxford University published a study
which found that the large dams built since 1934 suffered average cost
overruns of 96% and delays of 44%. In a conversation with International
Rivers, the Oxford study's co-author, Atif Ansar, cautioned against Inga
3. "It is a very high-risk project typical of dam disasters," he said.
Using the findings of the Oxford study to forecast cost overruns, he
suggested that the Bank's $14 billion estimated cost of Inga 3 should be
uplifted to $28 billion to obtain 80% certainty that the budget is not
exceeded. Given the cost risk's the dam is a non-starter in terms of
economic viability. Congo is at risk of drowning its fragile economy in
debt.
Further information:
. Background information on Inga 3: www.internationalrivers.org/node/8211
. Oxford dam study:
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421513010926
. Quotes from Oxford study co-author on Inga 3:
www.internationalrivers.org/node/8261
________________________________________________
This is International Rivers' mailing list on the role of international financial institutions in promoting large dams.
You received this message as a subscriber on the list: ifi@list.internationalrivers.org
To be removed from the list, please visit:
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White Elephant
International Rivers, March 20, 2014
www.internationalrivers.org/node/8272
Today, the World Bank Group Board of Directors approved a grant of $73
million for the Inga 3 Dam on the Congo River -€" the biggest hydropower
project the World Bank has ever funded. International Rivers denounces
the decision as support for a risky mega-project that will not benefit
the local population.
The 4800 megawatt Inga 3 Dam is the first phase of the giant Grand Inga
scheme in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Including the financing
costs, Inga 3 will cost $14 billion. The Bank's $73 million grant will
finance technical studies and legal work to prepare for the construction
of the dam, which is expected to start in 2016 and take seven years.
Even though only 9% of the DRC population has access to electricity, the
power generated by Inga 3 will primarily benefit mining companies and
export markets.
Rudo Sanyanga, the Africa Director of International Rivers, said: "By
approving Inga 3, the World Bank shows it has not learned lessons from
the bad experience of previous dams on the Congo River despite its
claims to the contrary. The Bank is turning a blind eye to the DRC's
poor governance and is taking short-cuts to the environmental assessment
of the project."
Peter Bosshard, the Policy Director of International Rivers, said:
"Solar, wind and micro-hydropower are more effective at reducing energy
poverty in Africa, and don't suffer the cost and time overruns that are
typical for large dams. We will continue to push the World Bank and the
DRC government to support clean local energy solutions rather than
Africa'€™s next white elephant."
On March 10, four researchers from Oxford University published a study
which found that the large dams built since 1934 suffered average cost
overruns of 96% and delays of 44%. In a conversation with International
Rivers, the Oxford study's co-author, Atif Ansar, cautioned against Inga
3. "It is a very high-risk project typical of dam disasters," he said.
Using the findings of the Oxford study to forecast cost overruns, he
suggested that the Bank's $14 billion estimated cost of Inga 3 should be
uplifted to $28 billion to obtain 80% certainty that the budget is not
exceeded. Given the cost risk's the dam is a non-starter in terms of
economic viability. Congo is at risk of drowning its fragile economy in
debt.
Further information:
. Background information on Inga 3: www.internationalrivers.org/node/8211
. Oxford dam study:
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421513010926
. Quotes from Oxford study co-author on Inga 3:
www.internationalrivers.org/node/8261
________________________________________________
This is International Rivers' mailing list on the role of international financial institutions in promoting large dams.
You received this message as a subscriber on the list: ifi@list.internationalrivers.org
To be removed from the list, please visit:
http://org.salsalabs.com/o/2486/unsubscribe.jsp
World Bank Grant for Inga 3 Dam Denounced as Support for Africa's Next White Elephant
World Bank Grant for Inga 3 Dam Denounced as Support for Africa's Next
White Elephant
International Rivers, March 20, 2014
www.internationalrivers.org/node/8272
Today, the World Bank Group Board of Directors approved a grant of $73
million for the Inga 3 Dam on the Congo River -€" the biggest hydropower
project the World Bank has ever funded. International Rivers denounces
the decision as support for a risky mega-project that will not benefit
the local population.
The 4800 megawatt Inga 3 Dam is the first phase of the giant Grand Inga
scheme in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Including the financing
costs, Inga 3 will cost $14 billion. The Bank's $73 million grant will
finance technical studies and legal work to prepare for the construction
of the dam, which is expected to start in 2016 and take seven years.
Even though only 9% of the DRC population has access to electricity, the
power generated by Inga 3 will primarily benefit mining companies and
export markets.
Rudo Sanyanga, the Africa Director of International Rivers, said: "By
approving Inga 3, the World Bank shows it has not learned lessons from
the bad experience of previous dams on the Congo River despite its
claims to the contrary. The Bank is turning a blind eye to the DRC's
poor governance and is taking short-cuts to the environmental assessment
of the project."
Peter Bosshard, the Policy Director of International Rivers, said:
"Solar, wind and micro-hydropower are more effective at reducing energy
poverty in Africa, and don't suffer the cost and time overruns that are
typical for large dams. We will continue to push the World Bank and the
DRC government to support clean local energy solutions rather than
Africa'€™s next white elephant."
On March 10, four researchers from Oxford University published a study
which found that the large dams built since 1934 suffered average cost
overruns of 96% and delays of 44%. In a conversation with International
Rivers, the Oxford study's co-author, Atif Ansar, cautioned against Inga
3. "It is a very high-risk project typical of dam disasters," he said.
Using the findings of the Oxford study to forecast cost overruns, he
suggested that the Bank's $14 billion estimated cost of Inga 3 should be
uplifted to $28 billion to obtain 80% certainty that the budget is not
exceeded. Given the cost risk's the dam is a non-starter in terms of
economic viability. Congo is at risk of drowning its fragile economy in
debt.
Further information:
. Background information on Inga 3: www.internationalrivers.org/node/8211
. Oxford dam study:
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421513010926
. Quotes from Oxford study co-author on Inga 3:
www.internationalrivers.org/node/8261
________________________________________________
You received this message as a subscriber on the list: africa@list.internationalrivers.org
To be removed from the list, please visit:
http://org.salsalabs.com/o/2486/unsubscribe.jsp
White Elephant
International Rivers, March 20, 2014
www.internationalrivers.org/node/8272
Today, the World Bank Group Board of Directors approved a grant of $73
million for the Inga 3 Dam on the Congo River -€" the biggest hydropower
project the World Bank has ever funded. International Rivers denounces
the decision as support for a risky mega-project that will not benefit
the local population.
The 4800 megawatt Inga 3 Dam is the first phase of the giant Grand Inga
scheme in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Including the financing
costs, Inga 3 will cost $14 billion. The Bank's $73 million grant will
finance technical studies and legal work to prepare for the construction
of the dam, which is expected to start in 2016 and take seven years.
Even though only 9% of the DRC population has access to electricity, the
power generated by Inga 3 will primarily benefit mining companies and
export markets.
Rudo Sanyanga, the Africa Director of International Rivers, said: "By
approving Inga 3, the World Bank shows it has not learned lessons from
the bad experience of previous dams on the Congo River despite its
claims to the contrary. The Bank is turning a blind eye to the DRC's
poor governance and is taking short-cuts to the environmental assessment
of the project."
Peter Bosshard, the Policy Director of International Rivers, said:
"Solar, wind and micro-hydropower are more effective at reducing energy
poverty in Africa, and don't suffer the cost and time overruns that are
typical for large dams. We will continue to push the World Bank and the
DRC government to support clean local energy solutions rather than
Africa'€™s next white elephant."
On March 10, four researchers from Oxford University published a study
which found that the large dams built since 1934 suffered average cost
overruns of 96% and delays of 44%. In a conversation with International
Rivers, the Oxford study's co-author, Atif Ansar, cautioned against Inga
3. "It is a very high-risk project typical of dam disasters," he said.
Using the findings of the Oxford study to forecast cost overruns, he
suggested that the Bank's $14 billion estimated cost of Inga 3 should be
uplifted to $28 billion to obtain 80% certainty that the budget is not
exceeded. Given the cost risk's the dam is a non-starter in terms of
economic viability. Congo is at risk of drowning its fragile economy in
debt.
Further information:
. Background information on Inga 3: www.internationalrivers.org/node/8211
. Oxford dam study:
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421513010926
. Quotes from Oxford study co-author on Inga 3:
www.internationalrivers.org/node/8261
________________________________________________
You received this message as a subscriber on the list: africa@list.internationalrivers.org
To be removed from the list, please visit:
http://org.salsalabs.com/o/2486/unsubscribe.jsp
Wednesday, March 19, 2014
Ending the Flood of Megadams/WSJ
(sorry for x-postings)
http://online.wsj.com/news/article_email/SB10001424052702304704504579430923019746140-lMyQjAxMTA0MDEwOTExNDkyWj
OPINION
Ending the Flood of Megadams
The $20 billion cost of the Itaipu Dam impaired Brazil's finances for three decades.
By BENT FLYVBJERG And ATIF ANSAR
March 18, 2014
Brazil, China, Ethiopia, Indonesia and Pakistan have begun to build large hydroelectric dams, after a decadelong lull world-wide. Yet these projects routinely come in late and over budget, and a new survey from Oxford University's Said Business School of 245 large dams built since 1934 reveals their dismal track record.
Brazil's Itaipu Dam was built in the 1970s. It cost nearly $20 billion, 240% more in real terms than predicted and it impaired Brazil's public finances for three decades. Despite producing much-needed electricity, Itaipu is unlikely to ever pay back its capital and debt costs. More recently, Ethiopia's $4.8 billion Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile, which began construction in 2011, will likely cost $10 billion before its projected completion in 2017--nearly a quarter of Ethiopia's GDP. Instead of helping Ethiopia grow, the dam could drown the country's fragile economy in debt.
These are not outliers. Actual construction costs of large dams are globally on average 96% higher than their budgets, and the magnitude of cost overruns hasn't declined. There is also the negative impact on human society and the environment such as flooding, as well as erosion, landslides and loss of fish populations. Then there are cost overruns and debt servicing.
The Itaipu hydroelectric dam, on the Parana river, Alto Parana. Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
Because megadams take 8.6 years on average and often more than 10 years to build, these projects don't ease urgent energy crises. The long lead time makes the projects especially vulnerable to currency volatility, inflation, political tensions, swings in water availability and electricity prices. Some combination of these constitutes the typical dam disaster.
For example, thanks to incorrect estimates of water availability, Kainji Dam in Nigeria has fallen short of its hydroelectricity production targets by as much as 70%. Volatile swings in water flow have threatened the dam's safety in times of flood and impaired its hydropower and irrigation benefits during drought.
Forecasters have proved incapable of accurately predicting or controlling projects. This is true for large hydroelectric dams, as well as airports, bridges, tunnels, public buildings, high-speed rail and Olympic Games. The optimists ignore hard facts and uncertainty, betting the house on projects with very low probability of success. The more pernicious exploit the project for private fiscal or political gain by predicting overly-positive investment prospects. The systematically poor outcomes of large dams suggest that either fools or liars are at the helm when initial budgets are estimated.
Proponents tend to focus on rare stories of megadam success. The Hoover Dam--finished in 1936--is used as a prime example. But decision makers should consider evidence for the entire dam record, and in the case of large dams, failure is much more likely.
Champions of these projects argue that renewable water resources could be wasted without dams with a wall height higher than 15 meters. Our research shows that smaller, more flexible hydroelectric projects that can be built and go online quicker, and are more easily adapted to social and environmental concerns, are preferable to high-risk megadams.
Norway is an excellent model of how a flexible approach can yield substantial payoffs. With 99% of its electricity produced from water, hydropower is highly successful in Norway. Pressure groups and political parties began to question large dams on environmental grounds at the turn of the century. The government responded with a plan to encourage small hydro development, defined as plants with an installed capacity of 10 megawatts or less, typically using low head and run-of-the-river technologies. Today, some 1,000 such plants exist in Norway and more are on the way.
Norway nurtured homegrown competitive and technologically innovative industries in hydropower planning, design, construction, turbine manufacturing and management. Instead of slowing down under criticism, Norwegian hydropower shifted and accelerated development.
This experience has yet to inform such emerging economies as Brazil, China, Indonesia and Pakistan. China needs the biggest rethink, with its plans to almost double its current hydropower capacity of 250,000 megawatts through a huge dam-building effort. Rather than drowning their economies in debt from megadams, developing countries should think of more agile alternatives.
Mr. Flyvbjerg is a professor of major program management at University of Oxford's Said Business School. Mr. Ansar is a lecturer at University of Oxford's Blavatnik School of Government.
________________________________________________
________________________________________________
You received this message as a subscriber on the list: africa@list.internationalrivers.org
To be removed from the list, please visit:
http://org.salsalabs.com/o/2486/unsubscribe.jsp
http://online.wsj.com/news/article_email/SB10001424052702304704504579430923019746140-lMyQjAxMTA0MDEwOTExNDkyWj
OPINION
Ending the Flood of Megadams
The $20 billion cost of the Itaipu Dam impaired Brazil's finances for three decades.
By BENT FLYVBJERG And ATIF ANSAR
March 18, 2014
Brazil, China, Ethiopia, Indonesia and Pakistan have begun to build large hydroelectric dams, after a decadelong lull world-wide. Yet these projects routinely come in late and over budget, and a new survey from Oxford University's Said Business School of 245 large dams built since 1934 reveals their dismal track record.
Brazil's Itaipu Dam was built in the 1970s. It cost nearly $20 billion, 240% more in real terms than predicted and it impaired Brazil's public finances for three decades. Despite producing much-needed electricity, Itaipu is unlikely to ever pay back its capital and debt costs. More recently, Ethiopia's $4.8 billion Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile, which began construction in 2011, will likely cost $10 billion before its projected completion in 2017--nearly a quarter of Ethiopia's GDP. Instead of helping Ethiopia grow, the dam could drown the country's fragile economy in debt.
These are not outliers. Actual construction costs of large dams are globally on average 96% higher than their budgets, and the magnitude of cost overruns hasn't declined. There is also the negative impact on human society and the environment such as flooding, as well as erosion, landslides and loss of fish populations. Then there are cost overruns and debt servicing.
The Itaipu hydroelectric dam, on the Parana river, Alto Parana. Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
Because megadams take 8.6 years on average and often more than 10 years to build, these projects don't ease urgent energy crises. The long lead time makes the projects especially vulnerable to currency volatility, inflation, political tensions, swings in water availability and electricity prices. Some combination of these constitutes the typical dam disaster.
For example, thanks to incorrect estimates of water availability, Kainji Dam in Nigeria has fallen short of its hydroelectricity production targets by as much as 70%. Volatile swings in water flow have threatened the dam's safety in times of flood and impaired its hydropower and irrigation benefits during drought.
Forecasters have proved incapable of accurately predicting or controlling projects. This is true for large hydroelectric dams, as well as airports, bridges, tunnels, public buildings, high-speed rail and Olympic Games. The optimists ignore hard facts and uncertainty, betting the house on projects with very low probability of success. The more pernicious exploit the project for private fiscal or political gain by predicting overly-positive investment prospects. The systematically poor outcomes of large dams suggest that either fools or liars are at the helm when initial budgets are estimated.
Proponents tend to focus on rare stories of megadam success. The Hoover Dam--finished in 1936--is used as a prime example. But decision makers should consider evidence for the entire dam record, and in the case of large dams, failure is much more likely.
Champions of these projects argue that renewable water resources could be wasted without dams with a wall height higher than 15 meters. Our research shows that smaller, more flexible hydroelectric projects that can be built and go online quicker, and are more easily adapted to social and environmental concerns, are preferable to high-risk megadams.
Norway is an excellent model of how a flexible approach can yield substantial payoffs. With 99% of its electricity produced from water, hydropower is highly successful in Norway. Pressure groups and political parties began to question large dams on environmental grounds at the turn of the century. The government responded with a plan to encourage small hydro development, defined as plants with an installed capacity of 10 megawatts or less, typically using low head and run-of-the-river technologies. Today, some 1,000 such plants exist in Norway and more are on the way.
Norway nurtured homegrown competitive and technologically innovative industries in hydropower planning, design, construction, turbine manufacturing and management. Instead of slowing down under criticism, Norwegian hydropower shifted and accelerated development.
This experience has yet to inform such emerging economies as Brazil, China, Indonesia and Pakistan. China needs the biggest rethink, with its plans to almost double its current hydropower capacity of 250,000 megawatts through a huge dam-building effort. Rather than drowning their economies in debt from megadams, developing countries should think of more agile alternatives.
Mr. Flyvbjerg is a professor of major program management at University of Oxford's Said Business School. Mr. Ansar is a lecturer at University of Oxford's Blavatnik School of Government.
________________________________________________
________________________________________________
You received this message as a subscriber on the list: africa@list.internationalrivers.org
To be removed from the list, please visit:
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Ending the Flood of Megadams/WSJ
http://online.wsj.com/news/article_email/SB10001424052702304704504579430923019746140-lMyQjAxMTA0MDEwOTExNDkyWj
OPINION
Ending the Flood of Megadams
The $20 billion cost of the Itaipu Dam impaired Brazil's finances for three decades.
By BENT FLYVBJERG And ATIF ANSAR
March 18, 2014
Brazil, China, Ethiopia, Indonesia and Pakistan have begun to build large hydroelectric dams, after a decadelong lull world-wide. Yet these projects routinely come in late and over budget, and a new survey from Oxford University's Sa�d Business School of 245 large dams built since 1934 reveals their dismal track record.
Brazil's Itaipu Dam was built in the 1970s. It cost nearly $20 billion, 240% more in real terms than predicted and it impaired Brazil's public finances for three decades. Despite producing much-needed electricity, Itaipu is unlikely to ever pay back its capital and debt costs. More recently, Ethiopia's $4.8 billion Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile, which began construction in 2011, will likely cost $10 billion before its projected completion in 2017�nearly a quarter of Ethiopia's GDP. Instead of helping Ethiopia grow, the dam could drown the country's fragile economy in debt.
These are not outliers. Actual construction costs of large dams are globally on average 96% higher than their budgets, and the magnitude of cost overruns hasn't declined. There is also the negative impact on human society and the environment such as flooding, as well as erosion, landslides and loss of fish populations. Then there are cost overruns and debt servicing.
The Itaipu hydroelectric dam, on the Parana river, Alto Parana. Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
Because megadams take 8.6 years on average and often more than 10 years to build, these projects don't ease urgent energy crises. The long lead time makes the projects especially vulnerable to currency volatility, inflation, political tensions, swings in water availability and electricity prices. Some combination of these constitutes the typical dam disaster.
For example, thanks to incorrect estimates of water availability, Kainji Dam in Nigeria has fallen short of its hydroelectricity production targets by as much as 70%. Volatile swings in water flow have threatened the dam's safety in times of flood and impaired its hydropower and irrigation benefits during drought.
Forecasters have proved incapable of accurately predicting or controlling projects. This is true for large hydroelectric dams, as well as airports, bridges, tunnels, public buildings, high-speed rail and Olympic Games. The optimists ignore hard facts and uncertainty, betting the house on projects with very low probability of success. The more pernicious exploit the project for private fiscal or political gain by predicting overly-positive investment prospects. The systematically poor outcomes of large dams suggest that either fools or liars are at the helm when initial budgets are estimated.
Proponents tend to focus on rare stories of megadam success. The Hoover Dam�finished in 1936�is used as a prime example. But decision makers should consider evidence for the entire dam record, and in the case of large dams, failure is much more likely.
Champions of these projects argue that renewable water resources could be wasted without dams with a wall height higher than 15 meters. Our research shows that smaller, more flexible hydroelectric projects that can be built and go online quicker, and are more easily adapted to social and environmental concerns, are preferable to high-risk megadams.
Norway is an excellent model of how a flexible approach can yield substantial payoffs. With 99% of its electricity produced from water, hydropower is highly successful in Norway. Pressure groups and political parties began to question large dams on environmental grounds at the turn of the century. The government responded with a plan to encourage small hydro development, defined as plants with an installed capacity of 10 megawatts or less, typically using low head and run-of-the-river technologies. Today, some 1,000 such plants exist in Norway and more are on the way.
Norway nurtured homegrown competitive and technologically innovative industries in hydropower planning, design, construction, turbine manufacturing and management. Instead of slowing down under criticism, Norwegian hydropower shifted and accelerated development.
This experience has yet to inform such emerging economies as Brazil, China, Indonesia and Pakistan. China needs the biggest rethink, with its plans to almost double its current hydropower capacity of 250,000 megawatts through a huge dam-building effort. Rather than drowning their economies in debt from megadams, developing countries should think of more agile alternatives.
Mr. Flyvbjerg is a professor of major program management at University of Oxford's Sa�d Business School. Mr. Ansar is a lecturer at University of Oxford's Blavatnik School of Government.
________________________________________________
You received this message as a subscriber on the list: dams@list.internationalrivers.org
To be removed from the list, please visit:
http://org.salsalabs.com/o/2486/unsubscribe.jsp
OPINION
Ending the Flood of Megadams
The $20 billion cost of the Itaipu Dam impaired Brazil's finances for three decades.
By BENT FLYVBJERG And ATIF ANSAR
March 18, 2014
Brazil, China, Ethiopia, Indonesia and Pakistan have begun to build large hydroelectric dams, after a decadelong lull world-wide. Yet these projects routinely come in late and over budget, and a new survey from Oxford University's Sa�d Business School of 245 large dams built since 1934 reveals their dismal track record.
Brazil's Itaipu Dam was built in the 1970s. It cost nearly $20 billion, 240% more in real terms than predicted and it impaired Brazil's public finances for three decades. Despite producing much-needed electricity, Itaipu is unlikely to ever pay back its capital and debt costs. More recently, Ethiopia's $4.8 billion Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile, which began construction in 2011, will likely cost $10 billion before its projected completion in 2017�nearly a quarter of Ethiopia's GDP. Instead of helping Ethiopia grow, the dam could drown the country's fragile economy in debt.
These are not outliers. Actual construction costs of large dams are globally on average 96% higher than their budgets, and the magnitude of cost overruns hasn't declined. There is also the negative impact on human society and the environment such as flooding, as well as erosion, landslides and loss of fish populations. Then there are cost overruns and debt servicing.
The Itaipu hydroelectric dam, on the Parana river, Alto Parana. Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
Because megadams take 8.6 years on average and often more than 10 years to build, these projects don't ease urgent energy crises. The long lead time makes the projects especially vulnerable to currency volatility, inflation, political tensions, swings in water availability and electricity prices. Some combination of these constitutes the typical dam disaster.
For example, thanks to incorrect estimates of water availability, Kainji Dam in Nigeria has fallen short of its hydroelectricity production targets by as much as 70%. Volatile swings in water flow have threatened the dam's safety in times of flood and impaired its hydropower and irrigation benefits during drought.
Forecasters have proved incapable of accurately predicting or controlling projects. This is true for large hydroelectric dams, as well as airports, bridges, tunnels, public buildings, high-speed rail and Olympic Games. The optimists ignore hard facts and uncertainty, betting the house on projects with very low probability of success. The more pernicious exploit the project for private fiscal or political gain by predicting overly-positive investment prospects. The systematically poor outcomes of large dams suggest that either fools or liars are at the helm when initial budgets are estimated.
Proponents tend to focus on rare stories of megadam success. The Hoover Dam�finished in 1936�is used as a prime example. But decision makers should consider evidence for the entire dam record, and in the case of large dams, failure is much more likely.
Champions of these projects argue that renewable water resources could be wasted without dams with a wall height higher than 15 meters. Our research shows that smaller, more flexible hydroelectric projects that can be built and go online quicker, and are more easily adapted to social and environmental concerns, are preferable to high-risk megadams.
Norway is an excellent model of how a flexible approach can yield substantial payoffs. With 99% of its electricity produced from water, hydropower is highly successful in Norway. Pressure groups and political parties began to question large dams on environmental grounds at the turn of the century. The government responded with a plan to encourage small hydro development, defined as plants with an installed capacity of 10 megawatts or less, typically using low head and run-of-the-river technologies. Today, some 1,000 such plants exist in Norway and more are on the way.
Norway nurtured homegrown competitive and technologically innovative industries in hydropower planning, design, construction, turbine manufacturing and management. Instead of slowing down under criticism, Norwegian hydropower shifted and accelerated development.
This experience has yet to inform such emerging economies as Brazil, China, Indonesia and Pakistan. China needs the biggest rethink, with its plans to almost double its current hydropower capacity of 250,000 megawatts through a huge dam-building effort. Rather than drowning their economies in debt from megadams, developing countries should think of more agile alternatives.
Mr. Flyvbjerg is a professor of major program management at University of Oxford's Sa�d Business School. Mr. Ansar is a lecturer at University of Oxford's Blavatnik School of Government.
________________________________________________
You received this message as a subscriber on the list: dams@list.internationalrivers.org
To be removed from the list, please visit:
http://org.salsalabs.com/o/2486/unsubscribe.jsp
Monday, March 17, 2014
Cambodia: Sinohydro dam route blocked
Dam route blocked
Phnom Penh Post, Mon, 17 March 2014
Phak Seangly and Daniel Pye
www.phnompenhpost.com/national/dam-route-blocked
Desperate ethnic minority villagers in Koh Kong province's Areng Valley
have blocked a road that was to be used to transport heavy machinery
onto their lands to start construction of the highly controversial Stung
Cheay Areng dam, according to villagers and officials.
Three Chinese employees of dam concessionaire Sinohydro Corp, who were
brought in to conduct assessments for the huge company, had to be
escorted out of the area by military police over the weekend after being
surrounded by villagers at a Sinohydro office.
Ven Vorn, 35, an ethnic Chorng village representative from Thmor Baing
district, said that about 150 villagers had worked in rotating shifts to
ensure the machinery did not leave land rented by the company in
preparation for construction of the dam.
"Thirty or 40 people took it in turns to block the access road, and if
we see the company bringing the machinery, we will close [the road]
immediately," he said yesterday.
The villagers decided to block the road after noticing the three
Sinohydro workers enter the site on Friday.
"When we saw the Chinese people, we were very worried. We are afraid of
the dam construction," Vorn said. "If the dam is constructed, about
10,000 hectares of our farms, houses and ancestral forest land will be
inundated."
Alex Gonzales-Davidson, founder of NGO Mother of Nature Cambodia, said
the villagers were planning to take their protest to the capital, along
with members of the Independent Monks Network and environmental activists.
"We plan to march [to Phnom Penh], but the important thing to do now is
to stop the machinery from entering the Areng Valley," he said.
"If [the machinery] is brought in, it will be hard to get [Sinohydro]
out of the area. If villagers are determined to resist, the world will
be surprised."
Pich Siyun, Koh Kong provincial director of mines and energy, said that
Sinohydro Corp was granted the contract because it had more experience
in large-scale dam construction.
"The company just wants to study the hydroelectric dam, and they need to
drill the land by using the machinery, since they cannot use their hands
to drill the land," Siyun said.
Last week, the Post reported that the local firm Sinohydro Corp
partnered with to build the dam, Sinohydro (Cambodia) United Ltd, had
two of Cambodia's most connected brokers – CPP senator Lao Meng Khin and
his wife Cheung Sopheap – on its board of governors.
Ith Praing, secretary of state at the Ministry of Industry Mines and
Energy, could not be reached for comment.
Phay Thoun Phlam Kesorn, deputy provincial governor, said that the
authorities had asked Sinohydro to stay out of the valley until the
situation calmed down.
"We are trying to calm down the villagers and explain to them about the
project. But the project will not be dropped," he said.
________________________________________________
This is International Rivers' mailing list on China's global footprint, and particularly Chinese investment in international dam projects.
You received this message as a subscriber on the list: chinaglobal@list.internationalrivers.org
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Phnom Penh Post, Mon, 17 March 2014
Phak Seangly and Daniel Pye
www.phnompenhpost.com/national/dam-route-blocked
Desperate ethnic minority villagers in Koh Kong province's Areng Valley
have blocked a road that was to be used to transport heavy machinery
onto their lands to start construction of the highly controversial Stung
Cheay Areng dam, according to villagers and officials.
Three Chinese employees of dam concessionaire Sinohydro Corp, who were
brought in to conduct assessments for the huge company, had to be
escorted out of the area by military police over the weekend after being
surrounded by villagers at a Sinohydro office.
Ven Vorn, 35, an ethnic Chorng village representative from Thmor Baing
district, said that about 150 villagers had worked in rotating shifts to
ensure the machinery did not leave land rented by the company in
preparation for construction of the dam.
"Thirty or 40 people took it in turns to block the access road, and if
we see the company bringing the machinery, we will close [the road]
immediately," he said yesterday.
The villagers decided to block the road after noticing the three
Sinohydro workers enter the site on Friday.
"When we saw the Chinese people, we were very worried. We are afraid of
the dam construction," Vorn said. "If the dam is constructed, about
10,000 hectares of our farms, houses and ancestral forest land will be
inundated."
Alex Gonzales-Davidson, founder of NGO Mother of Nature Cambodia, said
the villagers were planning to take their protest to the capital, along
with members of the Independent Monks Network and environmental activists.
"We plan to march [to Phnom Penh], but the important thing to do now is
to stop the machinery from entering the Areng Valley," he said.
"If [the machinery] is brought in, it will be hard to get [Sinohydro]
out of the area. If villagers are determined to resist, the world will
be surprised."
Pich Siyun, Koh Kong provincial director of mines and energy, said that
Sinohydro Corp was granted the contract because it had more experience
in large-scale dam construction.
"The company just wants to study the hydroelectric dam, and they need to
drill the land by using the machinery, since they cannot use their hands
to drill the land," Siyun said.
Last week, the Post reported that the local firm Sinohydro Corp
partnered with to build the dam, Sinohydro (Cambodia) United Ltd, had
two of Cambodia's most connected brokers – CPP senator Lao Meng Khin and
his wife Cheung Sopheap – on its board of governors.
Ith Praing, secretary of state at the Ministry of Industry Mines and
Energy, could not be reached for comment.
Phay Thoun Phlam Kesorn, deputy provincial governor, said that the
authorities had asked Sinohydro to stay out of the valley until the
situation calmed down.
"We are trying to calm down the villagers and explain to them about the
project. But the project will not be dropped," he said.
________________________________________________
This is International Rivers' mailing list on China's global footprint, and particularly Chinese investment in international dam projects.
You received this message as a subscriber on the list: chinaglobal@list.internationalrivers.org
To be removed from the list, please visit:
http://org.salsalabs.com/o/2486/unsubscribe.jsp
Friday, March 14, 2014
World Bank set to approve financing for Congo's Inga dam
World Bank set to approve financing for Congo's Inga dam
By Peter Jones
Reuters, March 14, 2014
http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/03/14/congo-democratic-inga-idINL6N0MB1W020140314
KINSHASA, March 14 (Reuters) - The World Bank is likely to approve $73
million next week to fund an expansion of the Inga hydroelectric dam in
Democratic Republic of Congo, a bank official said on Friday.
The decision will be a relief to investors, particularly mining
companies which have been threatened with electricity rationing due to a
lack of power generation, but environmentalists say the impact of the
project has not been properly evaluated.
The World Bank's administrative council had been due to meet on the
matter in Washington on Feb. 10, but that was postponed to March 20,
raising the prospect that the third phase of expansion of the Inga dam
on the Congo, 250 km (156 miles) southwest of Kinshasa, would not be
approved.
But World Bank country director in Congo, Eustache Ouayoro, told a news
conference in Kinshasa: "We have had discussions with the (Bank)
administrators which indicated to us that the project will be supported."
Only 9 percent of Congo's 65 million people have access to electricity
and the mining sector on which its economy relies has been hamstrung by
a lack of power.
In January, Prime Minister Augustin Matata Ponyo wrote a letter to
President Joseph Kabila setting out plans to ration power to major
international mining companies in the copper-rich Katanga province and
demanding that miners halt any plans for expansion.
The suspension of new mining projects comes as Congo is achieving record
high copper production: 942,000 tonnes in 2013, according to the
International Monetary Fund.
Two existing hydropower stations on the Congo river - Inga I and II -
are decades old and in disrepair, struggling to provide enough
electricity to meet demand.
Inga III, once built, would provide 4,800 MW of energy - this would
comfortably cover the 450 MW deficit mining companies in Katanga
complain of.
Campaign group International Rivers has called on the World Bank to fund
smaller, more local energy projects that it says would be less
environmentally damaging and more effective.
"The proposed Inga 3 Dam fails to reduce energy poverty and protect the
environment in the DRC," the group's policy director, Peter Bosshard, said.
The U.S. representative at the World Bank is likely to vote against the
Inga project following recent legislation in Congress directing U.S.
officials at international organizations to vote against big dams, but
Ouayoro believes the financing will be approved anyway.
President Joseph Kabila's government has said it hopes to begin
construction of Inga III by the end of 2015 but Ouayoro said this was
ambitious and he expected work to begin by the end of 2016.
"This is a gigantic project with enormous risks," he said. "The earlier
it starts the better, but 2015 will be difficult. We think the first
turbine will be operational five years after the start of construction,
but again it is a huge job." (Editing by Daniel Flynn and Robin Pomeroy)
________________________________________________
This is International Rivers' mailing list on the role of international financial institutions in promoting large dams.
You received this message as a subscriber on the list: ifi@list.internationalrivers.org
To be removed from the list, please visit:
http://org.salsalabs.com/o/2486/unsubscribe.jsp
By Peter Jones
Reuters, March 14, 2014
http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/03/14/congo-democratic-inga-idINL6N0MB1W020140314
KINSHASA, March 14 (Reuters) - The World Bank is likely to approve $73
million next week to fund an expansion of the Inga hydroelectric dam in
Democratic Republic of Congo, a bank official said on Friday.
The decision will be a relief to investors, particularly mining
companies which have been threatened with electricity rationing due to a
lack of power generation, but environmentalists say the impact of the
project has not been properly evaluated.
The World Bank's administrative council had been due to meet on the
matter in Washington on Feb. 10, but that was postponed to March 20,
raising the prospect that the third phase of expansion of the Inga dam
on the Congo, 250 km (156 miles) southwest of Kinshasa, would not be
approved.
But World Bank country director in Congo, Eustache Ouayoro, told a news
conference in Kinshasa: "We have had discussions with the (Bank)
administrators which indicated to us that the project will be supported."
Only 9 percent of Congo's 65 million people have access to electricity
and the mining sector on which its economy relies has been hamstrung by
a lack of power.
In January, Prime Minister Augustin Matata Ponyo wrote a letter to
President Joseph Kabila setting out plans to ration power to major
international mining companies in the copper-rich Katanga province and
demanding that miners halt any plans for expansion.
The suspension of new mining projects comes as Congo is achieving record
high copper production: 942,000 tonnes in 2013, according to the
International Monetary Fund.
Two existing hydropower stations on the Congo river - Inga I and II -
are decades old and in disrepair, struggling to provide enough
electricity to meet demand.
Inga III, once built, would provide 4,800 MW of energy - this would
comfortably cover the 450 MW deficit mining companies in Katanga
complain of.
Campaign group International Rivers has called on the World Bank to fund
smaller, more local energy projects that it says would be less
environmentally damaging and more effective.
"The proposed Inga 3 Dam fails to reduce energy poverty and protect the
environment in the DRC," the group's policy director, Peter Bosshard, said.
The U.S. representative at the World Bank is likely to vote against the
Inga project following recent legislation in Congress directing U.S.
officials at international organizations to vote against big dams, but
Ouayoro believes the financing will be approved anyway.
President Joseph Kabila's government has said it hopes to begin
construction of Inga III by the end of 2015 but Ouayoro said this was
ambitious and he expected work to begin by the end of 2016.
"This is a gigantic project with enormous risks," he said. "The earlier
it starts the better, but 2015 will be difficult. We think the first
turbine will be operational five years after the start of construction,
but again it is a huge job." (Editing by Daniel Flynn and Robin Pomeroy)
________________________________________________
This is International Rivers' mailing list on the role of international financial institutions in promoting large dams.
You received this message as a subscriber on the list: ifi@list.internationalrivers.org
To be removed from the list, please visit:
http://org.salsalabs.com/o/2486/unsubscribe.jsp
World Bank set to approve financing for Congo's Inga dam
World Bank set to approve financing for Congo's Inga dam
By Peter Jones
Reuters, March 14, 2014
http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/03/14/congo-democratic-inga-idINL6N0MB1W020140314
KINSHASA, March 14 (Reuters) - The World Bank is likely to approve $73
million next week to fund an expansion of the Inga hydroelectric dam in
Democratic Republic of Congo, a bank official said on Friday.
The decision will be a relief to investors, particularly mining
companies which have been threatened with electricity rationing due to a
lack of power generation, but environmentalists say the impact of the
project has not been properly evaluated.
The World Bank's administrative council had been due to meet on the
matter in Washington on Feb. 10, but that was postponed to March 20,
raising the prospect that the third phase of expansion of the Inga dam
on the Congo, 250 km (156 miles) southwest of Kinshasa, would not be
approved.
But World Bank country director in Congo, Eustache Ouayoro, told a news
conference in Kinshasa: "We have had discussions with the (Bank)
administrators which indicated to us that the project will be supported."
Only 9 percent of Congo's 65 million people have access to electricity
and the mining sector on which its economy relies has been hamstrung by
a lack of power.
In January, Prime Minister Augustin Matata Ponyo wrote a letter to
President Joseph Kabila setting out plans to ration power to major
international mining companies in the copper-rich Katanga province and
demanding that miners halt any plans for expansion.
The suspension of new mining projects comes as Congo is achieving record
high copper production: 942,000 tonnes in 2013, according to the
International Monetary Fund.
Two existing hydropower stations on the Congo river - Inga I and II -
are decades old and in disrepair, struggling to provide enough
electricity to meet demand.
Inga III, once built, would provide 4,800 MW of energy - this would
comfortably cover the 450 MW deficit mining companies in Katanga
complain of.
Campaign group International Rivers has called on the World Bank to fund
smaller, more local energy projects that it says would be less
environmentally damaging and more effective.
"The proposed Inga 3 Dam fails to reduce energy poverty and protect the
environment in the DRC," the group's policy director, Peter Bosshard, said.
The U.S. representative at the World Bank is likely to vote against the
Inga project following recent legislation in Congress directing U.S.
officials at international organizations to vote against big dams, but
Ouayoro believes the financing will be approved anyway.
President Joseph Kabila's government has said it hopes to begin
construction of Inga III by the end of 2015 but Ouayoro said this was
ambitious and he expected work to begin by the end of 2016.
"This is a gigantic project with enormous risks," he said. "The earlier
it starts the better, but 2015 will be difficult. We think the first
turbine will be operational five years after the start of construction,
but again it is a huge job." (Editing by Daniel Flynn and Robin Pomeroy)
________________________________________________
You received this message as a subscriber on the list: africa@list.internationalrivers.org
To be removed from the list, please visit:
http://org.salsalabs.com/o/2486/unsubscribe.jsp
By Peter Jones
Reuters, March 14, 2014
http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/03/14/congo-democratic-inga-idINL6N0MB1W020140314
KINSHASA, March 14 (Reuters) - The World Bank is likely to approve $73
million next week to fund an expansion of the Inga hydroelectric dam in
Democratic Republic of Congo, a bank official said on Friday.
The decision will be a relief to investors, particularly mining
companies which have been threatened with electricity rationing due to a
lack of power generation, but environmentalists say the impact of the
project has not been properly evaluated.
The World Bank's administrative council had been due to meet on the
matter in Washington on Feb. 10, but that was postponed to March 20,
raising the prospect that the third phase of expansion of the Inga dam
on the Congo, 250 km (156 miles) southwest of Kinshasa, would not be
approved.
But World Bank country director in Congo, Eustache Ouayoro, told a news
conference in Kinshasa: "We have had discussions with the (Bank)
administrators which indicated to us that the project will be supported."
Only 9 percent of Congo's 65 million people have access to electricity
and the mining sector on which its economy relies has been hamstrung by
a lack of power.
In January, Prime Minister Augustin Matata Ponyo wrote a letter to
President Joseph Kabila setting out plans to ration power to major
international mining companies in the copper-rich Katanga province and
demanding that miners halt any plans for expansion.
The suspension of new mining projects comes as Congo is achieving record
high copper production: 942,000 tonnes in 2013, according to the
International Monetary Fund.
Two existing hydropower stations on the Congo river - Inga I and II -
are decades old and in disrepair, struggling to provide enough
electricity to meet demand.
Inga III, once built, would provide 4,800 MW of energy - this would
comfortably cover the 450 MW deficit mining companies in Katanga
complain of.
Campaign group International Rivers has called on the World Bank to fund
smaller, more local energy projects that it says would be less
environmentally damaging and more effective.
"The proposed Inga 3 Dam fails to reduce energy poverty and protect the
environment in the DRC," the group's policy director, Peter Bosshard, said.
The U.S. representative at the World Bank is likely to vote against the
Inga project following recent legislation in Congress directing U.S.
officials at international organizations to vote against big dams, but
Ouayoro believes the financing will be approved anyway.
President Joseph Kabila's government has said it hopes to begin
construction of Inga III by the end of 2015 but Ouayoro said this was
ambitious and he expected work to begin by the end of 2016.
"This is a gigantic project with enormous risks," he said. "The earlier
it starts the better, but 2015 will be difficult. We think the first
turbine will be operational five years after the start of construction,
but again it is a huge job." (Editing by Daniel Flynn and Robin Pomeroy)
________________________________________________
You received this message as a subscriber on the list: africa@list.internationalrivers.org
To be removed from the list, please visit:
http://org.salsalabs.com/o/2486/unsubscribe.jsp
Thursday, March 13, 2014
Study Finds Big Cost Overruns on Global Dam Megaprojects
Study Finds Big Cost Overruns on Global Dam Megaprojects
Engineering News Record, 03/11/2014
By Scott Lewis
https://enr.construction.com/business_management/project_delivery/2014/0317-study-finds-big-cost-overruns-on-global-dam-megaprojects.asp
Large dam projects make bad investments, according to a new global study
by a team from Oxford University, England. Three-quarters of the
projects analyzed by researchers experienced cost overruns, with the
average increase reported as 96% higher in real terms than the figure
cited by the project owner when the construction decision was made, says
Bent Flyvbjerg, professor of major program management at the
university's Saïd Business School.
"We find that even before accounting for negative impacts on human
society and environment, the actual construction costs of large dams are
too high to yield a positive return," the study concludes. The report
analyzed all large dams built between 1934 and 2007, for which
comprehensive documentation was available. It covers 245 projects in 65
countries.
The documents include both business case documents, project appraisals
and implementation completion reports drawn from six sources: World
Bank, Asian Development Bank, World Commission on Dams, U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, Tennessee Valley Authority and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation.
"Sources of cost overruns can be divided into apparent causes and root
causes," says Atif Ansar, an associate fellow at the Saïd school and the
study's co-author. Apparent causes include site-specific characteristics
such as unfavorable geology, imported dam inputs with exposure to
commodity prices and exchange rate depreciation in developing countries.
"Underlying these apparent causes are root causes," adds Ansar. One root
cause is "optimism bias," which occurs when political officials make
too-bold claims of speed-of-project completion; these claims happen more
often in democracies than in authoritarian countries, the report
contends. Another root cause is "strategic misrepresentation," which is
when project promoters (deliberately) underestimate costs to push
approval, the study says.
The authors acknowledge that large dams in North America do not
experience certain problems facing dam owners and builders in developing
nations. Because North American dams are built with domestic inputs,
they are not exposed to exchange rates or global supply-chain problems,
researchers say. Nonetheless, the projects still experience cost
overruns, often tied to schedule delays due to optimism bias.
The study found that cost overruns on large dams are higher than for
most other large projects. The authors cite typical cost overruns of 6%
for thermal power plants, 20% for roads, 34% for fixed links (bridges
and tunnels) and 45% for railways. However, on nuclear powerplants, the
figure is 207%.
The study's "methods of evaluation appear to be credible but very
narrowly focused," says Keith Ferguson, national program leader for dams
and hydraulic structures at HDR and current president of the U.S.
Society on Dams, whose members are dam designers, builders, owners and
government officials. "They have highlighted our industry's past
challenges in estimating costs for construction," he adds. "The current
state of practice in the U.S. and beyond has a keen focus on estimating
costs more reliably, including introducing risk and uncertainty into the
cost modeling, to better understand and characterize the true long-term
impacts."
Peter Bosshard, policy director of International Rivers, an
environmental group, says the recent resurgence in megaprojects is
because China, Brazil and Korea "have pretty much rolled up the world
market." The Oxford study "poses serious questions" about whether large
dams should continue to be built, he says.
The International Energy Agency, part of the United Nations, recommends
building renewable projects and mini-grids to feed a small area. "It is
not cost-effective to extend national grids to reach the rural poor in
Africa and South Asia," says Bosshard. "The future of wind, solar and
small hydropower is probably more promising from a disinterested
investor perspective."
Flyvbjerg notes that the study "should not be seen as anti-hydropower
but against the flaws in the building of very large dams."
________________________________________________
You received this message as a subscriber on the list: dams@list.internationalrivers.org
To be removed from the list, please visit:
http://org.salsalabs.com/o/2486/unsubscribe.jsp
Engineering News Record, 03/11/2014
By Scott Lewis
https://enr.construction.com/business_management/project_delivery/2014/0317-study-finds-big-cost-overruns-on-global-dam-megaprojects.asp
Large dam projects make bad investments, according to a new global study
by a team from Oxford University, England. Three-quarters of the
projects analyzed by researchers experienced cost overruns, with the
average increase reported as 96% higher in real terms than the figure
cited by the project owner when the construction decision was made, says
Bent Flyvbjerg, professor of major program management at the
university's Saïd Business School.
"We find that even before accounting for negative impacts on human
society and environment, the actual construction costs of large dams are
too high to yield a positive return," the study concludes. The report
analyzed all large dams built between 1934 and 2007, for which
comprehensive documentation was available. It covers 245 projects in 65
countries.
The documents include both business case documents, project appraisals
and implementation completion reports drawn from six sources: World
Bank, Asian Development Bank, World Commission on Dams, U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, Tennessee Valley Authority and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation.
"Sources of cost overruns can be divided into apparent causes and root
causes," says Atif Ansar, an associate fellow at the Saïd school and the
study's co-author. Apparent causes include site-specific characteristics
such as unfavorable geology, imported dam inputs with exposure to
commodity prices and exchange rate depreciation in developing countries.
"Underlying these apparent causes are root causes," adds Ansar. One root
cause is "optimism bias," which occurs when political officials make
too-bold claims of speed-of-project completion; these claims happen more
often in democracies than in authoritarian countries, the report
contends. Another root cause is "strategic misrepresentation," which is
when project promoters (deliberately) underestimate costs to push
approval, the study says.
The authors acknowledge that large dams in North America do not
experience certain problems facing dam owners and builders in developing
nations. Because North American dams are built with domestic inputs,
they are not exposed to exchange rates or global supply-chain problems,
researchers say. Nonetheless, the projects still experience cost
overruns, often tied to schedule delays due to optimism bias.
The study found that cost overruns on large dams are higher than for
most other large projects. The authors cite typical cost overruns of 6%
for thermal power plants, 20% for roads, 34% for fixed links (bridges
and tunnels) and 45% for railways. However, on nuclear powerplants, the
figure is 207%.
The study's "methods of evaluation appear to be credible but very
narrowly focused," says Keith Ferguson, national program leader for dams
and hydraulic structures at HDR and current president of the U.S.
Society on Dams, whose members are dam designers, builders, owners and
government officials. "They have highlighted our industry's past
challenges in estimating costs for construction," he adds. "The current
state of practice in the U.S. and beyond has a keen focus on estimating
costs more reliably, including introducing risk and uncertainty into the
cost modeling, to better understand and characterize the true long-term
impacts."
Peter Bosshard, policy director of International Rivers, an
environmental group, says the recent resurgence in megaprojects is
because China, Brazil and Korea "have pretty much rolled up the world
market." The Oxford study "poses serious questions" about whether large
dams should continue to be built, he says.
The International Energy Agency, part of the United Nations, recommends
building renewable projects and mini-grids to feed a small area. "It is
not cost-effective to extend national grids to reach the rural poor in
Africa and South Asia," says Bosshard. "The future of wind, solar and
small hydropower is probably more promising from a disinterested
investor perspective."
Flyvbjerg notes that the study "should not be seen as anti-hydropower
but against the flaws in the building of very large dams."
________________________________________________
You received this message as a subscriber on the list: dams@list.internationalrivers.org
To be removed from the list, please visit:
http://org.salsalabs.com/o/2486/unsubscribe.jsp
Tuesday, March 11, 2014
Beware large dams and their handlers — study
http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africanbusiness/2014/03/11/beware-large-dams-and-their-handlers--study
Africa / African Business
Beware large dams and their handlers — study
BY RAZINA MUNSHI, MARCH 11 2014
MEGAPROJECTS should be approached with caution, as few managers anywhere in the world are able to forecast their costs and deadlines correctly, new research on megadams between 1934 and 2007 shows.
This applies particularly in the energy field and in Africa, making South Africa's support for the largest hydropower scheme in the world, the $100bn Grand Inga project in the Democratic Republic of Congo, quite risky.
Large dams usually overshoot their budgets by an average of 96%, which is more than any other asset class, including rail, roads and tunnels, Atif Ansar, Oxford University lecturer and associate fellow at its Saïd Business School tells Business Day.
Dr Ansar has co-authored a report published this month in Energy Policy journal, titled Should We Build More Large Dams? The Actual Cost of Hydropower Megaproject Development. "One ill-conceived dam in a developing country has the potential to cause a sovereign debt crisis," he says.
Pakistan's Tarbela dam, built in the 1970s, resulted in a 23% increase in Pakistan's external public debt stock between 1968 and 1984. Pakistan is still paying, decades later, says Dr Ansar.
Costs of dams are often too high to deliver risk-adjusted returns even in developed countries, his research has found.
Three out of every four large dams surveyed suffered cost overruns. They also took an average of 8.6 years to build, often making them ill-advised, and even dangerous.
African nations are particularly vulnerable. Costs are likely to spiral in countries with low per-capita incomes, unstable currencies and high inflation rates. Without strong economic fundamentals, as well as high-level expertise to manage complex projects, developing countries are at risk of damaging their economies by constructing large dams, Dr Ansar says.
Brazil's $14.4bn megadam, the Belo Monte hydroelectric project, is a classic example.
Tensions with local communities have overshadowed its economic sacrifice. By the time the dam is completed, its costs will have ballooned to $27.4bn. Public money, some from pension funds, has been used to build the dam, because of a lack of interest from private investors.
The research surveyed 245 large dams, with a total value of $353bn, built between 1934 and 2007 in 65 countries, including South Africa. All large dams for which valid and reliable data could be found were included.
There are other concerns. The ability of African countries to develop and manage mega-projects is limited, which increases the high risk of failure, head of capital projects advisory at Deloitte, Sheldon Morris, says.
Even in South Africa, where state enterprises such as Eskom and Transnet have commissioned large projects, in-house expertise is limited. Reliance on contractors is dangerously high.
Repeated delays to the construction of Eskom's 4,800MW Medupi power station have seen costs spiralling, the project is far from complete and problems have compounded.
Mr Morris says megaprojects around the world seem to attract the same people, who move from project to project, developing specialised and highly technical skills. African nations are rarely exposed to this expertise.
And Dr Ansar's research shows that managers do not learn from past mistakes. Forecasts about costs and deadlines are likely to be as misguided today as they were in 1934.
But Africa's demand for energy could result in a push for projects such as Grand Inga. It has the potential to produce up to 44,000MW from eight separate dams, more than a third of the electricity produced in Africa.
The Democratic Republic of Congo has dreamt of developing the project for decades, but internal conflict has prevented it from being realised.
In October last year, President Jacob Zuma signed a treaty with Congo's President Joseph Kabila to co-operate on Inga 3 Basse Chute, the next step in the development of the Grand Inga site. South Africa has committed itself before to buying 2,500MW from Inga 3, which will have a capacity of 4,800MW. The project could cost about $12bn.
This treaty, Mr Zuma said at the time, "represents a practical commitment of the two countries to jointly partner to develop this gigantic project". But it has not been released to the public, fuelling speculation that it adds little more to previous treaties.
Despite reports of plans to begin construction of Inga 3 in October, it is hard to tell whether there has been real progress.
Three bidders are standing in line to benefit: China Three Gorges and Sinohydro; Posco and Daewoo of South Korea in partnership with Canada's SNC-Lavalin Group; and Spain's Actividades de Construccion y Servicios and Eurofinsa Group.
The condition of Inga 1 and 2 underlines that investors should approach new projects with caution. Inga 1, built in 1972, and Inga 2, completed in 1982, have a capacity of only 1,775MW, but a lack of refurbishments have resulted in their operating even further below capacity.
Both have suffered from a chronic lack of maintenance. Power lines to Congo's capital Kinshasa, which is 450km away, have not been upgraded at all, according to news reports.
South Africa's reasons for supporting the project are said to be political. Cost savings do not appear to be the issue — South Africa is able to develop energy projects more cheaply. Energy from other renewable sources will cost significantly less than what South Africa will eventually pay for hydro-generated power from Congo.
The investor community's scepticism may also affect the project. Opinions at the recent Africa Energy Indaba in Johannesburg suggested investors are wary about megaproject development, in spite of high demand, and regardless of which asset class they fit into.
Smaller projects in South Africa have been very successful. Investment into South Africa's power sector has increased dramatically, but the record of investment in the rest of Africa is extremely low. Last year in sub-Saharan Africa excluding South Africa, just 12 renewable energy projects were closed.
The reality for Grand Inga is that only a successful Inga 3 would help raise investors' confidence in the remaining five stages of the project.
Dr Ansar's research has found fault with the behaviour of politicians and policy makers: they bring an "optimistic bias" to new projects, because they seek the support of a constituency wanting to see development.
Others deliberately mislead the public about the time and cost of getting projects approved, sometimes for personal benefit.
And some policy makers, he says, ignore rare events and problems that are likely to affect the project. They have difficulty processing the probability of events that may happen far into the future.
Policy makers should keep projects as short as possible, he believes. In Africa, limited funds, coupled with the urgency to grow the continent's energy capacity, lend themselves to the construction of smaller projects that can deliver energy projects quicker, using fewer resources.
sign-on to demand EDF drops Mphanda Nkuwa dam
Please sign on
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: [foei-EJRN] please sign-on to demand EDF drops Mphanda Nkuwa dam
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2014 10:13:00 +0200
From: Anabela Lemos <anabela.ja.mz@gmail.com>
To: Anabela Lemos <anabela.ja.mz@gmail.com>
Dear comrades,
As some of you know, JA has been fighting against the proposal Mphanda Nkuwa dam in the Zambezi river for well over 12 years. since the EIA was approved (2011) without even answering our questions and concerns, we have been following the energy-purchase agreements funding.
The reason this horrid project was not rejected, is Guebuza, the president of Mozambique´s own interest and involvement, using his power to push the project for his own benefit. The latest news was that the South African president Zuma and his son are also involved. see our blog on this topic here <http://ja4change.wordpress.com/2013/12/02/water-financialization-exposed-in-new-report-on-eve-of-wto-meeting-includes-critique-of-proposed-mphanda-nkuwa-dam-in-mozambique/>.
As such we discovered that EDF (Electricity of France), is interested in partly funding the project, so we hope to raise their awareness to such a risky project, and in doing so hopefully they will walk out of it.
Attached a letter that is already translated in French by Malika (FOE France), and will be delivered by them to EDF, and what i would love to have as many signatures as possible. FOE France is trying to get the local NGO signatures,and I'm sending to all of you for also have your support.
If you agree in endorsing your organisation to this letter, please do send an email to me: anabela.ja.mz@gmail.com <mailto:anabela.ja.mz@gmail.com>, as soon as possible, deadline
Another great news: a banner challenging Mphanda Nkuwa produced by FoE EWNI in conjunction with JA and UK artists will be displayed at the V&A Museum in London from July 2014 until early-2015. See a photo of the banner here <http://ja4change.wordpress.com/2012/09/25/stop-damming-the-zambezi/>.
Thanks,
Anabela
Director of JA!
________________________________________________
You received this message as a subscriber on the list: africa@list.internationalrivers.org
To be removed from the list, please visit:
http://org.salsalabs.com/o/2486/unsubscribe.jsp
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: [foei-EJRN] please sign-on to demand EDF drops Mphanda Nkuwa dam
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2014 10:13:00 +0200
From: Anabela Lemos <anabela.ja.mz@gmail.com>
To: Anabela Lemos <anabela.ja.mz@gmail.com>
Dear comrades,
As some of you know, JA has been fighting against the proposal Mphanda Nkuwa dam in the Zambezi river for well over 12 years. since the EIA was approved (2011) without even answering our questions and concerns, we have been following the energy-purchase agreements funding.
The reason this horrid project was not rejected, is Guebuza, the president of Mozambique´s own interest and involvement, using his power to push the project for his own benefit. The latest news was that the South African president Zuma and his son are also involved. see our blog on this topic here <http://ja4change.wordpress.com/2013/12/02/water-financialization-exposed-in-new-report-on-eve-of-wto-meeting-includes-critique-of-proposed-mphanda-nkuwa-dam-in-mozambique/>.
As such we discovered that EDF (Electricity of France), is interested in partly funding the project, so we hope to raise their awareness to such a risky project, and in doing so hopefully they will walk out of it.
Attached a letter that is already translated in French by Malika (FOE France), and will be delivered by them to EDF, and what i would love to have as many signatures as possible. FOE France is trying to get the local NGO signatures,and I'm sending to all of you for also have your support.
If you agree in endorsing your organisation to this letter, please do send an email to me: anabela.ja.mz@gmail.com <mailto:anabela.ja.mz@gmail.com>, as soon as possible, deadline
Another great news: a banner challenging Mphanda Nkuwa produced by FoE EWNI in conjunction with JA and UK artists will be displayed at the V&A Museum in London from July 2014 until early-2015. See a photo of the banner here <http://ja4change.wordpress.com/2012/09/25/stop-damming-the-zambezi/>.
Thanks,
Anabela
Director of JA!
________________________________________________
You received this message as a subscriber on the list: africa@list.internationalrivers.org
To be removed from the list, please visit:
http://org.salsalabs.com/o/2486/unsubscribe.jsp
Monday, March 10, 2014
Oxford study warns developing countries against dam projects
Oxford study warns developing countries against dam projects
Financial Times, March 10, 2014
By Pilita Clark in London
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/effcd742-a82f-11e3-8ce1-00144feab7de.html#axzz2vZmiAYwZ
An ill-advised splurge on large dams across the developing world is
likely to saddle countries with big debts, according to Oxford
university researchers who have found such projects typically cost
nearly twice as much as first estimated and rarely finish on time.
The findings are based on a study of 245 dams built in 65 countries
since 1934, making it one of the most comprehensive analyses since a
wave of mega-dams began around seven years ago, ending a 20-year lull in
such works.
Such projects, including Brazil's Belo Monte dam in the Amazon and the
Gilgel Gibe III dam in Ethiopia, promise to boost renewable energy in
countries eager to increase their electricity supplies without burning
more fossil fuels.
However, they often arouse opposition because they can require thousands
to be uprooted from their homes and flood fragile ecosystems.
Anti-dam campaigners will be bolstered by the Oxford study, which found
large dam construction costs were on average more than 90 per cent
higher than initial budgets, while eight out of 10 suffered a schedule
over-run.
It concludes the Brazilian and Ethiopian dams, and similar ones in
Pakistan, Myanmar and elsewhere, are likely to face "large cost and
schedule overruns seriously undermining their economic viability".
The research authors include Professor Bent Flyvbjerg, a prominent
critic of the optimistic assumptions behind mega-projects such as the
Olympic Games and new railway infrastructure.
"Our paper should not be seen as being against hydropower," he said,
adding there were many good examples of smaller hydroelectric projects
in countries such as Norway and Portugal that made sound economic sense.
However, the financial and economic impact of huge dams in developing
countries can be dire, Prof Flyvbjerg said, and their social and
environmental effects are "often horrendous".
"Taken together, that means it does not make much sense to build them,"
he said.
The reason so many projects do proceed is that the experts who make
forecasts about them "can be usefully grouped into 'fools' or 'liars'",
he said, explaining fools were recklessly optimistic while liars
deliberately mislead to get projects going.
Part of the problem for developing countries is they often have to
borrow a lot for imported goods or services to build big dams, putting
pressure on public finances that can be exacerbated by sudden exchange
rate swings.
The Itaipu dam Brazil built in the 1970s suffered a 240 per cent cost
over-run that impaired the country's finances for three decades, said
Prof Flyvbjerg. Colombia's Chivor hydropower project endured a 32 per
cent cost over-run after the peso depreciated nearly 90 per cent against
the dollar.
Such risks are less of a problem in wealthier countries such as the US,
home of the Hoover dam that is often cited as a success story.
Dam proponents frequently argue they have learnt from past mistakes and
can avoid the financial problems that plagued older dams.
However, the Oxford study, published in the Energy Policy journal,
suggests the magnitude of cost overruns has not declined over time and
dam budgets today are as wrong as at any time during the 70 years for
which there is data.
"If leaders of emerging economies are truly interested in the welfare of
their citizens, they are better off laying grand visions of mega-dams
aside," said Atif Ansar, co-author of the study.
(The new study is available at
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421513010926. You will
find a review by International Rivers at http://bit.l/DamStudy.)
________________________________________________
You received this message as a subscriber on the list: dams@list.internationalrivers.org
To be removed from the list, please visit:
http://org.salsalabs.com/o/2486/unsubscribe.jsp
Financial Times, March 10, 2014
By Pilita Clark in London
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/effcd742-a82f-11e3-8ce1-00144feab7de.html#axzz2vZmiAYwZ
An ill-advised splurge on large dams across the developing world is
likely to saddle countries with big debts, according to Oxford
university researchers who have found such projects typically cost
nearly twice as much as first estimated and rarely finish on time.
The findings are based on a study of 245 dams built in 65 countries
since 1934, making it one of the most comprehensive analyses since a
wave of mega-dams began around seven years ago, ending a 20-year lull in
such works.
Such projects, including Brazil's Belo Monte dam in the Amazon and the
Gilgel Gibe III dam in Ethiopia, promise to boost renewable energy in
countries eager to increase their electricity supplies without burning
more fossil fuels.
However, they often arouse opposition because they can require thousands
to be uprooted from their homes and flood fragile ecosystems.
Anti-dam campaigners will be bolstered by the Oxford study, which found
large dam construction costs were on average more than 90 per cent
higher than initial budgets, while eight out of 10 suffered a schedule
over-run.
It concludes the Brazilian and Ethiopian dams, and similar ones in
Pakistan, Myanmar and elsewhere, are likely to face "large cost and
schedule overruns seriously undermining their economic viability".
The research authors include Professor Bent Flyvbjerg, a prominent
critic of the optimistic assumptions behind mega-projects such as the
Olympic Games and new railway infrastructure.
"Our paper should not be seen as being against hydropower," he said,
adding there were many good examples of smaller hydroelectric projects
in countries such as Norway and Portugal that made sound economic sense.
However, the financial and economic impact of huge dams in developing
countries can be dire, Prof Flyvbjerg said, and their social and
environmental effects are "often horrendous".
"Taken together, that means it does not make much sense to build them,"
he said.
The reason so many projects do proceed is that the experts who make
forecasts about them "can be usefully grouped into 'fools' or 'liars'",
he said, explaining fools were recklessly optimistic while liars
deliberately mislead to get projects going.
Part of the problem for developing countries is they often have to
borrow a lot for imported goods or services to build big dams, putting
pressure on public finances that can be exacerbated by sudden exchange
rate swings.
The Itaipu dam Brazil built in the 1970s suffered a 240 per cent cost
over-run that impaired the country's finances for three decades, said
Prof Flyvbjerg. Colombia's Chivor hydropower project endured a 32 per
cent cost over-run after the peso depreciated nearly 90 per cent against
the dollar.
Such risks are less of a problem in wealthier countries such as the US,
home of the Hoover dam that is often cited as a success story.
Dam proponents frequently argue they have learnt from past mistakes and
can avoid the financial problems that plagued older dams.
However, the Oxford study, published in the Energy Policy journal,
suggests the magnitude of cost overruns has not declined over time and
dam budgets today are as wrong as at any time during the 70 years for
which there is data.
"If leaders of emerging economies are truly interested in the welfare of
their citizens, they are better off laying grand visions of mega-dams
aside," said Atif Ansar, co-author of the study.
(The new study is available at
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421513010926. You will
find a review by International Rivers at http://bit.l/DamStudy.)
________________________________________________
You received this message as a subscriber on the list: dams@list.internationalrivers.org
To be removed from the list, please visit:
http://org.salsalabs.com/o/2486/unsubscribe.jsp
Large Dams Are Uneconomic, Scientific Study Finds
(Sorry for cross-posting)
Large Dams Are Uneconomic, Scientific Study Finds
By Peter Bosshard
International Rivers, March 10, 2014
http://bit.ly/damstudy
"We find that even before accounting for negative impacts on human
society and environment, the actual construction costs of large dams are
too high to yield a positive return", a new report states. "Large dams
also take inordinately long periods of time to get built, making them
ineffective in resolving urgent energy crises." Simply put, dams don't
just destroy the environment and impoverish local communities. They also
don't make economic sense.
The new report was prepared by researchers from Oxford University and is
based on the most comprehensive economic analysis of large dams ever
undertaken. The peer-reviewed scientific study offers a devastating
verdict on the economics of large dams, and has important implications
for future energy sector planning.
Over four years, the authors of the new study - Atif Ansar, Bent
Flyvbjerg, Alexander Budzier and Daniel Lunn - analyzed all large dams
which were built between 1934 and 2007 and for which reliable costs and
schedule figures are available. Their database includes 245 projects in
65 countries with a total cost of $353 billion (in 2010 prices). The
findings of their analysis, which were published today, are stunning:
. Large dams suffered average cost overruns of 96%. The degree of cost
overruns tended to increase with the size of projects. Even without
considering social and environmental costs, large dams on average don't
make economic sense.
. Project implementation suffered an average delay of 44%. The
implementation schedule does not include the lengthy lead time required
to prepare projects.
Dam builders and financiers frequently acknowledge the problems of the
past, but claim that they have learned from their mistakes. The study by
the Oxford research team shows that this is not the case. Neither cost
nor schedule overruns have improved over time. "There is little learning
from past mistakes", the authors say. "By the same token, forecasts of
costs of dams being made today are likely to be as wrong as they were
between 1934 and 2007."
The World Bank and other development banks often argue that their
involvement improves the quality of risky projects. Again, the empirical
evidence does not confirm this. Atif Ansar told me in a personal
conversation that projects supported by multilateral development banks
"do not perform better in terms of cost overruns".
Both cost and schedule overruns affect projects in all world regions.
Poor countries tend to have higher delays, possibly because weak
government structures and economies don't support the construction of
complex large dams. Interestingly, projects in democratic countries also
tend to experience longer delays, possibly because elected politicians
use rosy forecasts to sell their projects.
The Oxford researchers conclude their evaluation with a series of
recommendations. They suggest that energy planners need to forecast
costs and schedules more realistically by integrating the empirical
evidence for similar projects. Based on their database, they suggest
that dam planners need to increase their cost estimates by 99% and their
construction schedules by 66% if they want to achieve an 80% certainty
that their projects are completed within budget and time.
The new paper illustrates what this means for the Diamer-Bhasha Dam in
Pakistan. With 80% certainty, the giant project on the Indus River can
be expected to cost $25.4 billion rather than $12.7 billion, and to be
completed in 2027 rather than 2021. Under these circumstances, the
project will not make economic sense. "Diamer-Bhasha Dam is a
non-starter in Pakistan", the authors comment. The same can be said for
the Inga dams on the Congo, the Belo Monte Dam in the Amazon, the
proposed dams on the Mekong mainstream and many other mega-projects.
The new research shows that energy projects that don't depend on complex
factors such as geology and streamflow and can be built quickly are
preferable to complex large dams. "Many smaller, more flexible projects
that can be built and go online quicker, and are more easily adapted to
social and environmental concerns, are preferable to high-risk dinosaur
projects like conventional mega-dams", concluded Bent Flyvbjerg, the
principal investigator, as the new paper was published. "If leaders of
emerging economies are truly interested in the welfare of their
citizens, they are better off laying grand visions of mega-dams aside",
his co-author Atif Ansar concurred.
Many actors have vested interests in building dams and may try to
disregard the findings of the new study. Disinterested government
officials and investors should take the facts and figures of the Oxford
study seriously. The empirical evidence demonstrates that even on
economic terms, large dams are usually not the best energy solution.
Peter Bosshard is the Policy Director of International Rivers. The new
study is available at
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421513010926.
________________________________________________
This is International Rivers' mailing list on the role of international financial institutions in promoting large dams.
You received this message as a subscriber on the list: ifi@list.internationalrivers.org
To be removed from the list, please visit:
http://org.salsalabs.com/o/2486/unsubscribe.jsp
Large Dams Are Uneconomic, Scientific Study Finds
By Peter Bosshard
International Rivers, March 10, 2014
http://bit.ly/damstudy
"We find that even before accounting for negative impacts on human
society and environment, the actual construction costs of large dams are
too high to yield a positive return", a new report states. "Large dams
also take inordinately long periods of time to get built, making them
ineffective in resolving urgent energy crises." Simply put, dams don't
just destroy the environment and impoverish local communities. They also
don't make economic sense.
The new report was prepared by researchers from Oxford University and is
based on the most comprehensive economic analysis of large dams ever
undertaken. The peer-reviewed scientific study offers a devastating
verdict on the economics of large dams, and has important implications
for future energy sector planning.
Over four years, the authors of the new study - Atif Ansar, Bent
Flyvbjerg, Alexander Budzier and Daniel Lunn - analyzed all large dams
which were built between 1934 and 2007 and for which reliable costs and
schedule figures are available. Their database includes 245 projects in
65 countries with a total cost of $353 billion (in 2010 prices). The
findings of their analysis, which were published today, are stunning:
. Large dams suffered average cost overruns of 96%. The degree of cost
overruns tended to increase with the size of projects. Even without
considering social and environmental costs, large dams on average don't
make economic sense.
. Project implementation suffered an average delay of 44%. The
implementation schedule does not include the lengthy lead time required
to prepare projects.
Dam builders and financiers frequently acknowledge the problems of the
past, but claim that they have learned from their mistakes. The study by
the Oxford research team shows that this is not the case. Neither cost
nor schedule overruns have improved over time. "There is little learning
from past mistakes", the authors say. "By the same token, forecasts of
costs of dams being made today are likely to be as wrong as they were
between 1934 and 2007."
The World Bank and other development banks often argue that their
involvement improves the quality of risky projects. Again, the empirical
evidence does not confirm this. Atif Ansar told me in a personal
conversation that projects supported by multilateral development banks
"do not perform better in terms of cost overruns".
Both cost and schedule overruns affect projects in all world regions.
Poor countries tend to have higher delays, possibly because weak
government structures and economies don't support the construction of
complex large dams. Interestingly, projects in democratic countries also
tend to experience longer delays, possibly because elected politicians
use rosy forecasts to sell their projects.
The Oxford researchers conclude their evaluation with a series of
recommendations. They suggest that energy planners need to forecast
costs and schedules more realistically by integrating the empirical
evidence for similar projects. Based on their database, they suggest
that dam planners need to increase their cost estimates by 99% and their
construction schedules by 66% if they want to achieve an 80% certainty
that their projects are completed within budget and time.
The new paper illustrates what this means for the Diamer-Bhasha Dam in
Pakistan. With 80% certainty, the giant project on the Indus River can
be expected to cost $25.4 billion rather than $12.7 billion, and to be
completed in 2027 rather than 2021. Under these circumstances, the
project will not make economic sense. "Diamer-Bhasha Dam is a
non-starter in Pakistan", the authors comment. The same can be said for
the Inga dams on the Congo, the Belo Monte Dam in the Amazon, the
proposed dams on the Mekong mainstream and many other mega-projects.
The new research shows that energy projects that don't depend on complex
factors such as geology and streamflow and can be built quickly are
preferable to complex large dams. "Many smaller, more flexible projects
that can be built and go online quicker, and are more easily adapted to
social and environmental concerns, are preferable to high-risk dinosaur
projects like conventional mega-dams", concluded Bent Flyvbjerg, the
principal investigator, as the new paper was published. "If leaders of
emerging economies are truly interested in the welfare of their
citizens, they are better off laying grand visions of mega-dams aside",
his co-author Atif Ansar concurred.
Many actors have vested interests in building dams and may try to
disregard the findings of the new study. Disinterested government
officials and investors should take the facts and figures of the Oxford
study seriously. The empirical evidence demonstrates that even on
economic terms, large dams are usually not the best energy solution.
Peter Bosshard is the Policy Director of International Rivers. The new
study is available at
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421513010926.
________________________________________________
This is International Rivers' mailing list on the role of international financial institutions in promoting large dams.
You received this message as a subscriber on the list: ifi@list.internationalrivers.org
To be removed from the list, please visit:
http://org.salsalabs.com/o/2486/unsubscribe.jsp
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